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265 
PUBLIC USE, PUBLIC CHOICE, AND THE URBAN 
GROWTH MACHINE: COMPETING POLITICAL 
ECONOMIES OF TAKINGS LAW 
Daniel A. Lyons* 
The Kelo decision has unleashed a tidal wave of legislative reforms ostensibly 
seeking to control eminent domain abuse. But as a policy matter, it is impossible to 
determine what limits should be placed upon local government without under-
standing how cities grow and develop, and how local governments make decisions 
to shape the communities over which they preside. This Article examines takings 
through two very different models of urban political economy: public choice theory 
and the quasi-Marxist Urban Growth Machine model. These models approach 
takings from diametrically opposite perspectives, and offer differing perspectives at 
the margin regarding proper and improper condemnations. But surprisingly, both 
models stand united in opposition to economic development takings and both view 
skeptically the current wave of eminent domain reform. By discussing why each 
model comes to this conclusion, this Article sheds additional light upon the sub-
stantive limits that legislatures should place upon eminent domain authority and 
procedural reforms that would help assure proper exercises of that power within 
this circumscribed scope. The Article also recommends greater cooperation between 
legislatures and judiciaries to develop these broad standards and to assure that 
condemnation authorities adhere to them in individual cases.  
Introduction 
Every few years, a Supreme Court decision captures the public’s 
attention in ways that legal scholars neither anticipate nor under-
stand. Kelo v. City of New London1 was such a case. Kelo involved a 
Connecticut town’s plan to spur economic development by seizing 
several private homes through eminent domain and converting the 
neighborhood into a commercial center anchored by pharmaceu-
tical giant Pfizer.2 The homeowners challenged the city’s action as 
inconsistent with the Takings Clause, which permits condemna-
tions only for “public use.”3 By a vote of 5–4 the Court turned away 
the homeowners’ challenge, explaining that “[f]or more than a 
                                                   
* Associate, Munger, Tolles & Olson, LLP. JD magna cum laude, Harvard Law School, 
2005; AB magna cum laude, Harvard College, 2000. Effective July 1, 2009, I will be an Assistant 
Professor at Boston College Law School. I wish to thank David Barron, Crystal Lyons, Grant 
Nelson, and Ilya Somin for their helpful comments and suggestions. Any errors, of course, are 
mine alone. 
1. 545 U.S. 469 (2005). 
2. Id. at 473–74. 
3. Id. at 475. 
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century, our public use jurisprudence has wisely eschewed rigid 
formulas and intrusive scrutiny in favor of affording legislatures 
broad latitude in determining what public needs justify the use of 
the takings power.”4 
Kelo was initially greeted with a collective yawn by the legal acad-
emy, which breezily explained that the holding flowed inexorably 
from the Court’s earlier takings decisions.5 But the public outcry 
was immediate and intense. “Within days [of the decision] Internet 
bloggers, television commentators, and neighbors talking over 
backyard fences decided that Kelo was an outrage.”6 According to 
two national surveys conducted in fall 2005, between 81 percent 
and 95 percent of respondents disagreed or strongly disagreed 
with the decision.7 The House of Representatives denounced the 
decision by a vote of 365–33.8 Even Justice Stevens, Kelo’s author, 
distanced himself from the decision in a later speech, explaining 
that he thought the city’s decision was “unwise” and that he would 
not have supported it as a legislator.9 
This harsh public response has prompted an equally unexpected 
legislative backlash to reform local condemnation authority. Since 
the Kelo decision, over forty states and the federal government have 
enacted some type of legislation to limit eminent domain’s reach.10 
From Alabama to Wyoming, legislators have accepted the Supreme 
Court’s challenge and endeavored to determine, as a policy matter, 
which local initiatives should be considered permissible public uses 
within the constitutional framework that Kelo affirmed. 
But answering this question is impossible without a nuanced un-
derstanding of how cities grow and develop, and how local 
governments make decisions to shape the communities over which 
they preside. It is somewhat of a constitutional misnomer to con-
                                                   
4. Id. at 483. 
5. See, e.g., Thomas W. Merrill, Six Myths about Kelo, Prob. & Prop., Jan.-Feb. 2006, at 
19, 19–20 (2006). 
6. Id. 
7. Ilya Somin, The Limits of Backlash: Assessing the Political Response to Kelo 93 Minn. L. 
Rev. (forthcoming 2009), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_ 
id=976298 (citing American Farm Bureau Federation Survey, Oct. 29–Nov. 2, 2005, Zogby 
International, and The Saint Index Poll, Oct.–Nov. 2005, Center for Economic and Civic 
Opinion at University of Massachusetts/Lowell). 
8. H.R. Res. 340, 109th Cong. (2005). 
9. Linda Greenhouse, Justice Weighs Desire v. Duty (Duty Prevails), N.Y. Times, Aug. 25, 
2005, at A1, cited in Merrill, supra note 5, at 19. 
10. Somin, supra note 7, at 1; see also Timothy Sandefur, The “Backlash” So Far: Will 
Americans Get Meaningful Eminent Domain Reform?, 2006 Mich. St. L. Rev. 709, 712 (discuss-
ing state and federal reforms in 2005 and 2006). As Somin notes, The Castle Coalition 
maintains a regularly updated list of such initiatives. Castle Coal., Legislative Center, http:// 
www.castlecoalition.org/legislation (last visited Oct. 23, 2008). 
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ceptualize a unitary “public” whose interests are furthered or dam-
aged by an individual taking. In reality, as with all polities, cities are 
an amalgam of various constituencies that pursue disparate, and 
often contradictory, goals regarding land use and community de-
velopment. To determine how local government should deploy the 
condemnation power to benefit these constituencies, one must 
first appreciate how local government presently exercises this power: 
which initiatives government frequently supports through eminent 
domain, and who benefits—and who suffers—from these deci-
sions.  
This Article addresses that issue by analyzing takings law through 
the lenses of two very different models of urban political economy. 
Public choice, or interest group, theory treats legislation as a good 
that is bought and sold like any other. Public choice theory criti-
cizes condemnation as a license for politically-connected interests 
to acquire property through legislative fiat rather than voluntary 
purchase, which in the process distorts market processes that 
would otherwise help land flow to its most efficient use. By com-
parison, the Urban Growth Machine model espoused by John 
Logan and Harvey Molotch focuses upon the conflict in local poli-
tics between those forces interested in economic development and 
residents whose lives are disrupted by it.11 Rooted in part in Marx’s 
bifurcation of use and exchange value, the Urban Growth Machine 
model criticizes eminent domain as a powerful tool by which pro-
development forces overcome local opposition to capital, decimat-
ing communities and disrupting residents’ lives in pursuit of rising 
exchange values through ever-intensifying land uses. 
The application of these lenses suggests that the current wave of 
post-Kelo reforms is misguided and unlikely to correct eminent 
domain abuse. Public choice theory and the Growth Machine 
model approach the issue from diametrically opposite perspectives, 
and offer differing perspectives at the margin regarding proper 
and improper condemnations. But both models stand united in 
opposition to economic development takings and both view skepti-
cally the likelihood that state legislatures have corrected—or are 
capable of correcting—this abuse. By discussing why each model 
comes to this conclusion, this Article sheds additional light upon 
the substantive limits that legislatures should place upon eminent 
domain authority and procedural reforms that would help assure 
proper exercises of that power within this circumscribed scope of 
authority. The Article also recommends greater cooperation  
                                                   
11. John R. Logan & Harvey L. Molotch, Urban Fortunes: The Political Econ-
omy of Place 1–2, 17–29 (1987). 
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between legislatures and judiciaries to develop these broad stan-
dards and to assure that condemnation authorities adhere to them 
in individual cases. 
I. The Constitutional Expansion of Public Use 
Before delving into the political economies underlying current 
condemnation practice, it is helpful to summarize briefly the evo-
lution of takings as a constitutional matter. The Fifth Amendment 
unites under one heading several fundamental rights that the gov-
ernment may not abridge without proper legal procedure, 
including the Parthian shot “nor shall private property be taken for 
public use without just compensation.” The effect of this clause as a 
substantive limit on the sovereign has evolved over time, as courts 
have struggled to define the government’s proper role in an in-
creasingly industrial society. 
A. Intellectual Origins of American Property Rights 
Many commentators on both sides of the political spectrum 
trace the Takings Clause to the Lockean theory of property rights.12 
In his First and Second Treatises of Government, Locke argues that 
property is a natural and pre-political right originating in the labor 
theory of value. An individual owns his body, and by mixing his la-
bor with property in the common, he acquires title to that property 
as an extension of himself.13 Because property rights originate in 
                                                   
12. See Richard A. Epstein, Takings: Private Property and the Power of Emi-
nent Domain 19–20 (1985); David Andrew Schultz, Private Property and Public Use 
in American Constitutional Law 2, 5 (1989) (“[I]n colonial America . . . Locke’s [politi-
cal theory] was perhaps the most influential.”); Jeffrey M. Gaba, John Locke and the Meaning of 
the Takings Clause, 72 Mo. L. Rev. 525, 526–28 (2007) (“Locke’s stature as one of the major 
intellectual figures in American constitutional history is universally acknowledged. . . . [A]nd 
some would claim that America is a ‘Lockean nation.’ ”) (citations omitted); Cass R. Sun-
stein, Why Does the American Constitution Lack Social and Economic Guarantees?, 56 Syracuse L. 
Rev. 1, 9 (2005) (“John Locke, of course, was a large influence on American political 
thought.”). 
13. John Locke, The Second Treatise of Government 18–21 (Crawford B. 
Macpherson ed., Hackett Pub. Co. 1980) (1690) (“As much land as a man tills, plants, im-
proves, cultivates, and can use the product of, so much is his property. He by his labour 
does, as it were, inclose it from the common.”). Locke argues that these natural rights flow 
from God, who gave the Earth to men in common with the commandment that it be im-
proved through labor. Id. at 18–19. Needless to say, such an argument would hold little sway 
in today’s secular society. But as Richard Epstein explains, Locke’s reliance on God is not 
fatal to his scheme, for a rule of first possession accomplishes the same result. If each indi-
vidual owns his own labor and those things to which his labor extends, then things in the 
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the state of nature, preexisting even the most primitive of societies, 
they grant their owner singular and absolute control over a thing 
that no one, including the state, could violate: “The supreme 
power cannot take from any man any part of his property without 
his own consent.”14  
For Locke, property is closely tied to personal individual liberty, 
the sphere wherein one has absolute reign.15 It is to protect this 
sphere that individuals leave the state of nature and form a gov-
ernment: “the preservation of property [is] the end of 
government, and that for which men enter into society.”16 There-
fore property forms a nearly indefeasible claim against society and 
government alike: 
Men therefore in society having property, they have such a 
right to the goods, which by the law of the community are 
their’s [sic], that no body hath a right to take their substance 
or any part of it from them, without their own consent . . . . 
Hence it is a mistake to think that the supreme or legislative 
power of any common-wealth, can do what it will, and dispose 
of the estates of the subject arbitrarily, or take any part of 
them at pleasure.17 
Informed by Locke’s equation of property with liberty, the Tak-
ings Clause imposes two independent checks on the power of the 
government to seize private property. The first is that a taking can 
occur only pursuant to a valid “public use.” The “public use” re-
quirement is a substantive limit on government power, an outer 
                                                   
state of nature are owned not in common, but by no one. As a result, the first person to 
acquire a thing, mixing his labor with the object, acquires individual ownership. See Epstein, 
supra note 12, at 11; Richard A. Epstein, Possession as the Root of Title, 13 Ga. L. Rev. 1221, 
1221 (1979). 
This rationale also sidesteps the problem of ousting common ownership, a problem 
Locke struggles mightily to overcome through his “as much and as good” limitations on 
property acquisition. See Locke, supra, at 21. The rule of first possession accords with the 
traditional common law view of ownership. See, e.g., Pierson v. Post, 3 Cai. 175 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 
1805) (famously holding that a hunter acquires no property right through the pursuit of a 
fox, and thus a rival hunter who kills the fox commits no trespass); Epstein, supra note 12, 
at 11. 
14. Locke, supra note 13, at 73; see also Schultz, supra note 12, at 7. 
15. See Schultz, supra note 12, at 6 (“Locke’s theory of property is political, with the 
language of property used to defend the political liberty of Englishmen against the Crown. 
It is this political linkage of property to personal power that was most influential on Amer-
ica.”). 
16. Locke, supra note 13, at 73. 
17. Id.  
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boundary beyond which the sovereign cannot stray.18 The second is 
the requirement that “just compensation” be paid in the event of 
the taking. This prong works as a process-based check within the 
scope of enumerated power: representative government can take a 
parcel for public use only if it is willing to expend treasure to do 
so.19 The clause’s two-tiered approach thus gives the government 
the flexibility to exercise the sovereign’s power of eminent domain, 
but in a fashion that heeds Locke’s warning that:  
[A] man’s property is not at all secure, tho’ there be good and 
equitable laws to set the bounds of it between him and his fel-
low subjects, if he who commands those subjects have power 
                                                   
18. Some commentators have challenged the notion that the “public use” prong of the 
Takings Clause imposes any substantive limit on government power. See, e.g., Schultz, supra 
note 12, at 104 (citing John Lewis, A Treatise on the Law of Eminent Domain in the 
United States (1909)). Textually, the clause reads “nor shall private property be taken for 
public use, without just compensation.” It does not read “nor shall private property be taken 
except for public use.” Because this word is missing, the text of the Takings Clause does not 
preclude the government from taking property for private use; it merely requires that where 
a property is taken for public use, just compensation must be paid. See Merrill, supra note 5, 
at 21. 
This reading, of course, is somewhat at odds with Supreme Court precedent which de-
clared as early as 1796 that the government lacks the power to “take property from A[] and 
give[] it to B.” Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386, 388 (1798); see infra text accompanying 
notes 21–24. Nonetheless, in light of the structure of the Fifth Amendment it is possibly 
more correct to state that the prohibition on takings for private use flows not from the Tak-
ings Clause, but the Due Process Clause. Such an approach finds support in the Court’s 
regulatory takings jurisprudence:  
As its text makes plain, the Takings Clause does not prohibit the taking of private 
property, but instead places a condition on the exercise of that power. In other 
words, it is designed not to limit the governmental interference with property rights 
per se, but rather to secure compensation in the event of otherwise proper interference 
amounting to a taking. 
Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A., 544 U.S. 528, 536–37 (2005) (internal quotation marks and cita-
tion omitted). This formulation also finds some support in the seminal physical takings case 
of Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 33 (1954), which stated that “[o]nce the object is within the 
authority of Congress, the right to realize it through the exercise of eminent domain is 
clear. For the power of eminent domain is merely the means to the end.” 
This distinction is not without importance: because economic regulation is subject only to 
rational basis review, a takings limitation anchored in the Due Process Clause affords private 
property much less constitutional protection than advocates of eminent domain reform are 
likely to prefer.  
19. Epstein disputes this purpose for the “just compensation” limitation. For him, just 
compensation is the route by which a taking secures the consent of the governed: a rational 
person would consent to a transaction that leaves him objectively better off by compensating 
him for what he has lost. Epstein, supra note 12, at 15–16. But as discussed supra, this con-
ception is flawed: if just compensation truly left the landowner “objectively better off” then 
the landowner would have voluntarily consented to the transaction. 
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to take from any private man, what part he pleases of his 
property, and use and dispose of it as he thinks good.20 
B. Gradual Judicial Expansion of Public Use 
The pre-Marshall Court case of Calder v. Bull21 contained a strik-
ing early endorsement of a narrow “public use” principle. In a 
sweeping opinion rooted in natural law, Justice Chase warned state 
and federal governments against violating the “fundamental prin-
ciple[s]” that “are the foundation of the legislative power” and 
“decide what are the proper objects of it.”22 Among the examples of 
legislative action forbidden by the “general principles of law and 
reason” is “a law that takes property from A, and gives it to B,” a 
transgression that Justice Chase places on par with “punish[ing] a 
citizen . . . for an act, which, when done, was in violation of no ex-
isting law.”23 “It is against all reason and justice, for a people to 
entrust a Legislature with such powers,” wrote Justice Chase, “and, 
therefore, it cannot be presumed that they have done it.”24 
Despite this warning (or perhaps because of it), the Supreme 
Court would not hear a case under the Takings Clause until 1875.25 
Eighteenth-century eminent domain law was hashed out in state 
courts, where debates raged as to meaning of state constitutional 
“public use” requirements. Colonial and early American exercises 
of the eminent domain power were limited primarily to the build-
ing of roads, schools, and other public buildings, public goods 
whose title remained for the most part in government’s hands.26 
Summarizing the state of the law in 1871, Thomas Cooley wrote 
that:  
[T]he public use implies a possession, occupation, and en-
joyment of the land by the public at large, or by public 
agencies; and a due protection to the rights of private prop-
erty will preclude the government from seizing it in the hands 
of the owner, and turning it over to another on vague grounds 
                                                   
20. Locke, supra note 13, at 73–74. 
21. 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386. 
22. Id. at 388. 
23. Id. 
24. Id. 
25. Kohl v. United States, 91 U.S. 367 (1875) (upholding federal government’s con-
demnation of land for a post office). 
26. Schultz, supra note 12, at 98. 
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of public benefit to spring from the more profitable use to 
which the latter may devote it.27  
As Cooley acknowledges, however, the pressures of the Industrial 
Revolution slowly tore the public use doctrine away from its public-
ownership roots. The first visible beneficiaries were railroads, en-
gines of commerce in both a figurative and literal sense that 
turned to government to solve holdout problems among existing 
landowners. In Bloodgood v. Mohawk & Hudson Railroad,28 New York 
upheld a state statute granting railroads the power to take private 
land to build rail lines, as long as compensation was paid to the 
owner.29 Although the law violated Justice Chase’s maxim that legis-
latures cannot take property from A and give it to B, the takings 
were justified because “the conveyance of travelers, or the trans-
portation of merchandise from one part of the State to another 
[are] public improvements and for the public benefit.”30 
Grain milling was another quite visible industry that received 
eminent domain assistance. Operating an eighteenth-century mill 
generally required substantial water pressure, which owners ob-
tained by damming a nearby water source. These dams, however, 
frequently flooded neighboring parcels. In a foreshadowing of the 
later use of eminent domain to overcome local resistance to devel-
opment, many states passed general mill acts that permitted the 
flooding to occur (often but not always upon payment of just com-
pensation), on the grounds that the mills thereby constructed were 
open to use by the public.31  
The “use by the public” test proved a tempting lure to avoid the 
law’s prohibition on taking property from A to give to B. But as a 
growing number of enterprises attempted to shoehorn their pur-
poses into the test’s confines, a brief backlash appeared in state 
courts. In Massachusetts, Chief Justice Lemuel Shaw reassessed the 
mill acts, holding they were not takings cases but a special species 
                                                   
27. Thomas M. Cooley, A Treatise on the Constitutional Limitations Which 
Rest Upon the Legislative Power of the States of the American Union 585–86 (2d 
ed. 1871). 
28. 18 Wend. 9 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1837). 
29. Id. at 15–16 
30. Id. at 13. (citing Beekman v. Saratoga & Schenectady R.R. Co., 3 Paige Ch. 45 (N.Y. 
Ch. 1831)) It is worth noting that this expansion of the takings power was often controver-
sial. For example, the Missouri Constitution, adopted in 1875, provides that railroads cannot 
acquire fee simple title to a parcel through eminent domain. The railroad could use con-
demnation to secure an easement, but “[t]he fee of land taken for railroad purposes without 
consent of the owner thereof shall remain in such owner subject to the use for which it is 
taken.” Mo. Const. art. I, § 26. 
31. See Schultz, supra note 12, at 101–02. 
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of riparian law to which the public use and just compensation re-
quirements did not apply, and as a result did not constitute 
precedent for a general expansion of the public use doctrine.32 
Other courts grafted a “necessity” requirement to the “use by the 
public test” as a way of narrowing the availability of the eminent 
domain power.33 But confusion over such idiosyncratic issues as 
who could access the property and which use restrictions owners 
could place on a facility created a checkerboard of inconsistent 
public use exceptions toward the end of the nineteenth century. By 
1871, Cooley could write with assurance that the takings clause was 
not a general license to engage in economic planning, but just 
where the boundary lay between permissible and impermissible 
takings was unclear.34 
Early Supreme Court cases, focusing on whether the Fourteenth 
Amendment’s Due Process Clause prevented a state from taking 
from A and giving to B, displayed similarly mixed results. In the 
1896 Missouri Pacific Railway v. Nebraska opinion,35 the Court con-
sidered whether Nebraska could force a private railroad to enter a 
lease with local grain farmers to construct and operate a grain ele-
vator on the railroad’s land. The farmers initially sought to 
negotiate with the railroad, but when the latter refused, the state 
ordered the railroad to comply by invoking its common carrier 
laws.36 The Supreme Court invalidated the order, holding that 
“[t]he taking by a State of the private property of one person or 
corporation, without the owner’s consent, for the private use of 
another, is not due process of law, and is a violation of the Four-
teenth . . . Amendment.”37 
But Missouri Pacific Railway was quickly displaced by an ever-
expanding view of the state’s condemnation power that swept far 
past the contours of Cooley’s nineteenth-century treatise. Over the 
next three decades, the Supreme Court would approve an irriga-
tion system for desert farmers,38 waterways and aerial tramways for 
                                                   
32. Id. at 102; David Schultz, What’s Yours Can Be Mine: Are There Any Private Takings Af-
ter Kelo v. City of New London?, 24 UCLA J. Envtl. L. & Pol’y 195, 202 (2006). 
33. See Comment, The Public Use Limitation on Eminent Domain: An Advance Requiem, 58 
Yale L.J. 599, 606–07 (1949). 
34. See Donald J. Kochan, “Public Use” and the Independent Judiciary: Condemnation in an 
Interest-Group Perspective, 3 Tex. Rev. L. & Pol. 49, 67 (1998). 
35. 164 U.S. 403 (1896). 
36. Id. at 411–13. 
37. Id. at 417. Notably, the Court decided the case as a matter of Due Process, not as a 
Taking. The Court noted that “[t]he order in question was not, and was not claimed to be, 
either in the opinion of the court below, or in the argument for the defendant in error in 
this court, a taking of private property for a public use under the right of eminent domain.” 
Id. at 416. 
38. Fallbrook Irrigation Dist. v. Bradley, 164 U.S. 112, 158–64 (1896). 
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mining companies,39 and hydroelectric power40 as “public uses,” in 
the process explicitly rejecting the “use by the public” test that had 
framed the nineteenth-century condemnation power.41 The only 
taking struck down during this period as an invalid public use was 
one in which the government’s purpose was a naked land grab to 
sell the excess for profit.42 The thread uniting each case was a belief 
that economic expansion was in the public interest and could be 
aided by government coercion of those who would stand as barri-
ers to progress.  
C. The Present Doctrine 
The modern takings doctrine originates in the 1954 Berman v. 
Parker decision.43 At issue was the District of Columbia Redevelop-
ment Act of 1945, which allowed for the condemnation of large 
tracts of Washington for the purpose of slum clearance.44 Plaintiff 
department store owners, whose property was not a slum but was 
included in the tract to be taken, challenged the condemnation 
power largely because of the District’s ability to take more than it 
needed and to sell or lease the surplus to private companies.45 De-
spite earlier case law suggesting that excess condemnation was not 
a valid public use,46 the Court permitted the taking,47 declaring that 
                                                   
39. Strickley v. Highland Boy Gold Mining Co., 200 U.S. 527, 531 (1906); Clark v. 
Nash, 198 U.S. 361, 368–70 (1905). 
40. Mt. Vernon-Woodbury Cotton Duck Co. v. Ala. Interstate Power Co., 240 U.S. 30 
(1916). 
41. As noted above, the Court decided these cases under the Fourteenth Amend-
ment’s Due Process Clause. See Ilya Somin, Controlling the Grasping Hand: Economic 
Development Takings after Kelo, 15 Sup. Ct. Econ. Rev. 183, 270 (2007). But this technicality 
is largely a distinction without a difference with respect to the Court’s views on proper and 
improper public uses. The Fallbrook Court explained that while the Fifth Amendment did 
not apply to states and the Court lacked jurisdiction to consider whether the state court 
erred in its interpretation of state constitutional law:  
[T]he citizen is deprived of his property without due process of law, if it be taken by 
or under state authority for any other than a public use, either under the guise of 
taxation or by the assumption of the right of eminent domain. In that way the ques-
tion whether private property has been taken for any other than a public use 
becomes material in this court, even where the taking is under the authority of the 
State instead of the Federal government.  
Fallbrook, 164 U.S. at 158. 
42. Cincinnati v. Vester, 281 U.S. 439 (1930). 
43. 348 U.S. 26 (1954). 
44. Id. at 28–30 (discussing D.C. Code Ann. §§ 5-701 to -719 (1951)). 
45. Berman, 348 U.S. at 29–31. 
46. See Vester, 281 U.S. at 447. 
47. Berman, 348 U.S. at 36. 
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“the legislature, not the judiciary, is the main guardian of the pub-
lic needs to be served by social legislation,” and that “[t]his 
principle admits of no exception merely because the power of 
eminent domain is involved.”48  
Berman represents the eminent domain aspect of an amended 
constitutional structure that adapted seventeenth-century property 
law to fit an industrial age. Even at the height of Lochner-era judi-
cial scrutiny of state economic regulation,49 the Euclid Court 
permitted local governments to engage in extensive land use plan-
ning designed to guide and promote economic development while 
mitigating nuisances.50 As Cass Sunstein notes, the demise of 
Lochner and ascension of the New Deal led to even greater judicial 
deference toward state action designed to benefit private parties, 
actions which in previous eras would have been condemned as im-
permissible.51 Throughout the late nineteenth and twentieth 
centuries, local government was increasingly seen as a partner in 
progress, with both the power and the duty to take an active role in 
economic development to better the lives of its citizenry. 
Interested critics may use two distinct models to analyze this 
worldview, each aimed at a different component of the philosophy 
underlying the Berman regime. Public choice theory challenges the 
faith Berman places in the legislative process to determine which 
projects are socially beneficial; the Growth Machine model chal-
lenges Berman’s conclusion that economic development is a 
suitable public policy end. Each theory is critical of current emi-
nent domain law, but in different and nuanced ways; it is to these 
critiques that this Article now turns. 
                                                   
48. Id. at 32. 
49. See Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 57 (1905) (finding that a “right to free con-
tract” implicit in the due process clause precluded state legislation limiting the number of 
hours each week that a baker may work). 
50. See Vill. of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 390–97 (1926); John A. 
Saurenman, Keystone, Nollan and First English Three Years Later: How Fare the States?, 3 
Emerging Issues St. Const. L. 115, 132 (1990) (finding it “surprising that the Lochner 
Court gave its approval to zoning”). 
51. Cass R. Sunstein, Naked Preferences and the Constitution, 84 Colum. L. Rev. 1689, 
1724–25 (1984). 
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II. Public Choice and Public Use 
If you rob Peter to pay Paul, you’ve already got half the vote. 
—Aegyptophilus52 
A. Theoretical Underpinnings 
Interest group theory aims to demystify the aura surrounding 
the legislative process by rejecting the presumption that govern-
ment endeavors to further the public interest.53 Instead, each 
political actor is assumed to pursue self-interested ends: politicians 
trade political access for assistance with re-election, and special in-
terest groups provide that assistance in exchange for legislation 
that maximizes their own well-being.54 Interest group theory posits 
that “legislation is a good demanded and supplied as much as 
other goods, so that legislative protection flows to those groups 
that derive the greatest value from it, regardless of overall social 
welfare.”55 Or in the words of Gordon Tullock, “People are People 
. . . . ‘Homo politicus and homo economicus are the same.’ ”56 
In many ways, interest group theory is only the modern incarna-
tion of James Madison’s concern with faction. Madison, who would 
later write the Fifth Amendment’s Takings Clause, explained in The 
Federalist No. 10 that factions were an inevitable part of the legisla-
tive process: “different classes of legislators [are] but advocates and 
parties to the causes which they determine,” and “[i]t is in vain to 
say that enlightened statesmen will be able to adjust those clashing 
interests and render them all subservient to the public good.”57 
When left unchecked, Madison wrote, “the public good is disre-
garded in the conflicts of rival parties, and . . . measures are too 
often decided, not according to the rules of justice . . . but by the 
superior force of an interested and overbearing [faction].”58 
                                                   
52. Quoted in Kelley L. Ross, Rent Seeking, Public Choice, and the Prisoner’s Dilemma, 
http://www.friesian.com/rent.htm (last visited Oct. 23, 2008). 
53. See, e.g., Einer R. Elhauge, Does Interest Group Theory Justify More Intrusive Judicial Re-
view?, 101 Yale L.J. 31, 35 (1991); Gordon Tullock, The Theory of Public Choice, in Gordon 
Tullock et al., Government Failure: A Primer in Public Choice 3, 3–6 (2002). 
54. Elhauge, supra note 53, at 35. 
55. Richard A. Posner, Economics, Politics, and the Reading of Statutes and the Constitution, 
49 U. Chi. L. Rev. 263, 265 (1982), quoted in Kochan, supra note 34, at 79. 
56. Tullock, supra note 53, at 3 (quoting William F. Shughart II, Public-Choice Theory 
and Antitrust Policy, in The Causes and Consequences of Antitrust: The Public Choice 
Perspective 7, 9–10 (Fred S. McChesney & William F. Shughart II eds., 1995)). 
57. The Federalist No. 10, at 44–45 (James Madison) (Penguin Classics ed., 1987). 
58. Id. at 42. 
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The sine qua non of interest group theory is rent-seeking, the 
expenditure of resources by special interest groups to secure favor-
able government treatment. Rent-seeking is successful largely 
because of the phenomenon of concentrated benefits and dis-
persed costs. For any given piece of legislation, the benefits are 
concentrated in a few recipients who have a strong incentive to ob-
tain or preserve their perks. By comparison, the costs are dispersed 
among the public at large. The individual bill in question costs the 
individual taxpayer a trivial amount, much less than the costs that 
would be incurred by fighting the legislation.59 Therefore it is irra-
tional for any individual taxpayer to combat rent-seeking through 
the political process.  
In this fashion, public choice theorists describe how special in-
terests “capture” the public lawmaking process for private gain. 
Because the interest group in question stands to gain a substantial 
benefit from favorable legislation, it has an incentive to lobby the 
appropriate public officials to secure that legislation through cam-
paign contributions or other favors up to the point that the costs of 
lobbying exceed the benefit of the legislation.60 The public officials 
comply because they benefit personally from the resources spent 
on lobbying, while the costs of the legislation are borne by the pub-
lic as a whole rather than the policymakers themselves. And the 
taxpayers remain rationally ignorant of the transaction: in most 
cases, the cost of the legislation to the individual taxpayer is less 
than the alternative cost of researching the legislation and fighting 
it.61 In this fashion, each party, acting rationally, acquiesces in the 
creation of rent-seeking legislation without ever having to consider 
whether the public benefits from the transaction. 
One may glean several additional insights from this model of 
legislative action. For example, the greater the taxpayer’s 
information costs, the more likely he is to remain rationally ignorant 
of the legislation. Special interests and politicians therefore have 
incentives to structure legislation in ways that hide the true costs 
from the public, for example by negotiating in private or by offering 
a public rationale for the legislation that is difficult to validate.62 In 
addition, repeat players in the rent-seeking game enjoy 
                                                   
59. These costs include, inter alia, the information costs of investigating the costs of an 
issue and identifying those similarly situated, and the organizational costs of combining 
those affected into a coalition to fight the rent-seeking legislation. See Jonathan R. Macey, 
Promoting Public-Regarding Legislation Through Statutory Interpretation: An Interest Group Model, 
86 Colum. L. Rev. 223, 229 (1986). 
60. See Kochan, supra note 34, at 80. 
61. See Macey, supra note 59, at 229. 
62. See Kochan, supra note 34, at 80–82. 
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comparative advantages over newcomers: the repeat player’s 
transaction costs of rent-seeking are lower because it has already 
learned from experience the efficient ways to lobby public officials 
and it enjoys a reputational advantage in that the public official 
knows the interest group is capable of delivering on its end of the 
rent-seeking bargain.63 
B. Interest Group Theory and Eminent Domain 
At first glance, the “concentrated benefits, dispersed costs” pub-
lic choice story seems ill-suited to describe eminent domain 
initiatives. When the government takes from A and gives to B, 
one’s initial notion is that the situation is better described as one of 
“concentrated benefits, concentrated costs” because A loses his 
property and B gains it. Exploring the dynamics of takings further, 
however, two rejoinders help explain why the public choice model 
applies in this setting. 
First, the payment of just compensation largely “decreases the cost 
to the affected owner of the land seized and thereby decreases his 
incentive to invest in fighting the condemnation.”64 The compensa-
tion requirement essentially “buys off” the affected landowners from 
the general fisc, at least in part, which spreads much of the cost of 
the taking among a broad range of rationally ignorant taxpayers.65 
Whether the entity seeking title then receives the land free or for a 
small fee from the government, the result is a transfer that mimics 
the traditional rent-seeking subsidy story.66 The benefits of the 
transaction are concentrated in the entity seeking the condemna-
tion, while the costs are divided between the affected landowner 
and the general public.  
                                                   
63. See id. at 82. 
64. Id. (citation omitted); see also Daniel A. Farber, Public Choice and Just Compensation, 
9 Const. Comment. 279, 289–91 (1992); Daryl J. Levinson, Empire-Building Government in 
Constitutional Law, 118 Harv. L. Rev. 915, 968–71 (2005). 
65. See Recent Cases, Eminent Domain—Nongovernmental Takings—Michigan Supreme 
Court Holds that Government Cannot Take Land to Develop a Private Office Park—County of 
Wayne v. Hathcock, 648 N.W.2d 765 (Mich. 2004), 118 Harv. L. Rev. 1769, 1773 (2005) 
(“When the government takes private property and pays compensation for it, the entire tax-
paying public bears the burden and has an incentive to monitor the use of that power. 
When property is transferred to a private party, however, the private recipient effectively 
pays compensation, and the general public has little financial incentive to scrutinize the 
taking.”) (citations omitted); see also Levinson, supra note 64 (arguing that paying compen-
sation from the public fisc may deter opposition to the taking by spreading the costs across a 
diffuse electorate rather than a single, motivated property owner). 
66. See Kochan, supra note 34, at 83. 
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Of course, “just compensation” does not always completely offset 
the costs suffered by the landowner; if it did, landowners would 
never challenge takings. But the landowner who fights a taking de-
spite the offer of just compensation typically faces substantial 
disadvantages in the market for political favors. The interest group 
seeking the condemnation is more likely than the landowner to be 
a repeat player in this market. While the landowner’s efforts to 
fight the taking could also be classified as rent-seeking, he is forced 
to do so and is more likely to be a one-shot participant in the mar-
ket for political favors.67 As a repeat player, the interest group 
benefits from lower transaction costs and reputational benefits 
over the landowner as discussed above.68 Moreover, the landowner 
suffers from a collective action problem. Organizing opposition to 
a condemnation requires significant time and resources, but suc-
cessful opposition benefits all affected landowners, not just those 
who invest in the struggle. As a result, affected landowners are 
tempted to free ride on the efforts of their neighbors, making it 
less likely that opposition will develop. Together, these advantages 
tilt the political field sharply in favor of the party seeking the tak-
ing. 
C. Limitations of the Interest Group Model 
As a positive theory, the interest group model is a powerful tool 
to analyze the inner workings of the political process, and pro-
vides key insights for individuals seeking to explain or navigate 
the political process. But, as Einer Elhauge argues, the model 
loses some force when deployed normatively: “conclusions that 
interest groups have ‘captured’ regulators or exercised ‘dispro-
portionate’ influence depend implicitly on . . . baseline views of 
what degree of influence is appropriate for that group.”69 It serves 
little purpose to condemn developers for “rent-seeking” when they 
pursue a taking; as noted above, property owners who lobby to de-
feat a proposed taking could be thought of as engaging in “rent-
seeking” as well.70 “The condemnation of the political process 
                                                   
67. See id. at 82. 
68. See id. (“[T]he special interest is likely to have more political influence, because 
unlike the landowner, the interest group is probably a repeat player in the political process 
and thereby able to offer more to legislators.”); see also supra text accompanying notes 59–61. 
69. Elhauge, supra note 53, at 48. 
70. See Kochan, supra note 34, at 79–80 (“Though the theory speaks of legislation, it is 
legislation broadly understood, thereby including legislative acts, administrative agency 
actions, and executive actions. Indeed, the theory is also not limited to the affirmative act of 
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draws [its] persuasiveness,” at least in part, “from the underlying 
normative theory” accompanying the description of interest 
group dynamics.71 
In his article condemning “naked preferences,” Cass Sunstein 
invokes what can be thought of as a weak interest group theory in 
support of civic republicanism.72 Sunstein argues that the Takings 
Clause and several other constitutional provisions are aimed at “a 
single underlying evil: the distribution of resources or opportuni-
ties to one group rather than another solely on the ground that 
those favored have exercised the raw political power to obtain 
what they want.”73 A substantive prohibition on legislation reflect-
ing naked preferences frees legislators from the control of faction 
and forces them instead to select values through measured, care-
ful deliberation and debate.74 In most areas of constitutional law, 
Sunstein explains, the prohibition on naked preferences requires 
the government to put forth a reason “other than raw political 
power to justify an exercise of authority.”75 This is a minimal re-
quirement that the current Berman takings standard likely 
satisfies. 
Most public choice proponents, however, take a much stronger 
tone. Public choice theory takes as its “normative baseline” a 
strong faith in the robustness of markets to produce socially effi-
cient outcomes.76 For many public choice theorists, the price 
mechanism is the optimal tool by which society uncovers the op-
timal use of a parcel. A buyer interested in a parcel will offer a 
price roughly equivalent to the benefit he expects to derive from 
the parcel. The owner will sell only if that offer exceeds the bene-
fit he currently derives from his use of the land. In this fashion, 
                                                   
legislation. Interest groups may often bargain to block legislation or to receive regulatory 
forbearance.”) (citations omitted). 
71. Elhauge, supra note 53, at 49. 
72. See Sunstein, supra note 51, at 1689. 
73. Id. 
74. Id. at 1691, 1698. 
75. Id. at 1698. As a descriptive matter, Sunstein concedes that “this is a trivial con-
straint, for almost any decision can be justified by reference to a public value.” Id. 
Nonetheless, he explains, the prohibition on naked preferences is an important reminder 
that constitutional law should focus on the substantive limits of government power, repudi-
ating the pluralist notion that “the judicial role is only to police the processes of 
representation to ensure that all affected interest-groups may participate.” Id. at 1692–93; see 
also Kathleen M. Sullivan & Gerald Gunther, Constitutional Law 627 (14th ed. 
2001) (contrasting Sunstein’s naked preferences theory with the process-oriented view of 
equal protection espoused by John Hart Ely). 
76. See, e.g., Tullock, supra note 53, at 8–16; Kochan, supra note 34, at 80 (describing 
the rent-seeking problem as one where “[s]pecial interests seek to use the government to 
obtain higher prices for goods or services than would otherwise be obtainable under com-
petitive market conditions.”). 
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land will naturally flow to the user who values it most and can ex-
tract the most value from the parcel. 
The public choice theorist’s critique of eminent domain, there-
fore, is that it allows parcels to change owners without this market 
check to assure the transaction is efficient. Provided markets are 
functioning normally, the use of eminent domain to transfer a 
parcel from A to B creates a deadweight loss to society by shifting 
a parcel to a less efficient use. The fact that the owner prefers to 
retain ownership rather than sell the parcel on the open market 
implies that the owner derives greater utility from ownership and 
use than competing potential owners would. This premium, the 
amount by which the current owner values the parcel greater 
than other potential buyers, is known as the consumer surplus. 
Eminent domain sacrifices that consumer surplus in the name of 
political expediency. This reallocation of property to an owner 
who values the property less than the previous owner produces a 
deadweight loss to society in the form of lost consumer surplus, as 
the parcel is put to a less efficient use.77 In the process, resources 
are spent on promoting or opposing rent-seeking legislation, re-
sources that could otherwise be diverted toward productive 
ventures.78 
With this normative baseline thus exposed, one recognizes two 
primary limitations upon the public choice model when applied 
to eminent domain law. First and foremost, public choice theory 
struggles to oppose takings conducted against the backdrop of a 
“market failure.” But just what constitutes a market failure is not 
certain among public choice theorists. There seems to be clear 
consensus that government action is permissible to procure “pub-
lic goods” such as roads whose non-excludability and limited 
profit potential creates a substantial risk of underproduction if 
left to market forces alone.79 But it is unclear whether, for example, 
holdouts, nuisances, and other market failures are strong enough 
to override the normative baseline in favor of market forces and 
justify government intervention (including, where necessary, tak-
ings).80 In other words, the range of categories condemned as 
                                                   
77. Cf. Tullock, supra note 53, at 43–51. 
78. See id. 
79. See, e.g., William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, An Economic Analysis of Copyright, 
18 J. Legal Stud. 325, 325–33 (1989). 
80. Kochan, for example, admits that with regard to holdouts and similar market fail-
ures, “[s]ome exercises of the condemnation power, for example, may in fact be in the best 
interest of overall utility in society even when they transfer property to private entities.” 
Kochan, supra note 34, at 87. Similarly, Daniel Kelly admits that the curing of nuisances 
through blight condemnations “is unlikely to cause socially undesirable transactions.” Daniel B. 
Kelly, The “Public Use” Requirement in Eminent Domain Law: A Rationale Based on Secret Purchases 
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inefficient “rent-seeking” under public choice theory varies de-
pending upon the range of circumstances in which one is willing 
to recognize market failures and the need for intervention.  
Second, public choice focuses primarily upon the current 
owner’s use of the parcel, without considering other potential 
stakeholders victimized by a taking. If the owner is not also a resi-
dent, the model fails to account for the utility the separate tenant 
also derives from the parcel: while the tenant’s rent reflects much 
of the utility the tenant derives from the parcel, the tenant also 
likely has some retained consumer surplus in the parcel’s 
pre-condemnation use.81 Public choice also does not give much 
consideration to the utility that nonresidents derive from the par-
cel’s pre-condemnation use. If the tenant is the local grocer, for 
example, neighborhood customers would also derive utility from 
the parcel’s current use. These non-owner stakeholders receive 
little, if any, “just compensation” for their lost consumer surplus 
and therefore are not “bought off” under the “concentrated 
benefits, dispersed costs” story spun above.82 They may still lack 
the political advantages of local developers, but the disincentives 
to organize may not be as significant as interest group theory 
makes them seem. 
Despite these drawbacks, however, the public choice model 
provides a useful lens through which to examine the merits of 
particular categories of condemnation actions. The rent-seeking 
story is strongest when one can identify an actor that clearly bene-
fits from a taking and therefore has an incentive to lobby for it, 
and when the government fails to put forth a plausible theory of 
market failure to justify the invocation of the political process to 
transfer title. In these instances, the use of eminent domain to 
supplant a functioning market raises significant concerns about 
                                                   
and Private Influence, 92 Cornell L. Rev. 1, 57 (2006). Kelly recommends the use of secret 
agents to purchase parcels on behalf of the developer as a solution to the holdout problem. 
See id. at 5–7, 18–24. While the secret agent solution works in some instances, this proposal 
suffers structural problems that preclude its adoption to many putative condemnations. 
Specifically, it may prove difficult to keep the identity of the actual buyer and its future in-
tentions a secret, particularly if the developer is a high-profile entity. Moreover, the time lag 
necessary to negotiate individual transactions (staggered so as not to arouse suspicion) may 
prove prohibitive as well. 
81. Admittedly, some states provide for tenants to share in certain condemnation 
awards. For example, in California commercial tenants may receive compensation if their 
leases have “bonus value,” meaning that they guarantee the tenant a fixed rent below fair 
market value. See, e.g., City of S. San Francisco v. Mayer, 79 Cal. Rptr. 2d 704, 706 & n.1 (Ct. 
App. 1998). Residential tenants rarely have bonus value because they are typically in month-
to-month leases, although municipal codes may provide for some quantum of tenant reloca-
tion expenses upon condemnation. See, e.g., L.A., Cal., Mun. Code § 151.09(G) (2005). 
82. See supra text accompanying notes 64–67. 
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the propriety of the action and the assumption that the transac-
tion in fact enhances social utility or otherwise fulfills a public 
use. 
III. The Sword of Damocles: Eminent Domain  
and the Urban Growth Machine 
Cities . . . do not compete to please people; they compete to please 
capital—and the two activities are fundamentally different.83 
A. The Urban Growth Machine 
John Logan and Harvey Molotch’s 1987 work Urban Fortunes of-
fers a different perspective on local government. It describes local 
politics not as shaped by a competition among various interest 
groups for influence, but instead as dominated by the “Growth 
Machine,” a powerful network of local elites dedicated to eco-
nomic development.84 The Growth Machine coalition, which 
includes a broad array of city elites ranging from local landowners 
and capitalists to labor leaders, newspaper editors, utilities, univer-
sities, museums, and politicians, work to build community support 
behind controversial development measures and stifle opposition 
from affected residents.85 
The Growth Machine thesis rose in opposition to two prominent 
public choice-influenced theories of local government. In A Pure 
Theory of Local Expenditures, Charles Tiebout envisions towns com-
peting against one another in a market for taxpaying residents.86 
Each town offers a bundle of goods and services packaged to at-
tract a certain type of resident, and residents in turn choose the 
bundle that most fits their preferences.87 Under Tiebout’s model, 
local government makes policy choices by adapting to the migra-
tion of residents away from towns with suboptimal bundles of 
goods and toward those with more attractive offerings.88  
                                                   
83. See Logan & Molotch, supra note 11, at 42. 
84. Id. at 17–49. Urban Fortunes stems from an earlier Molotch article that outlined the 
book’s central thesis. See Harvey L. Molotch, The City as a Growth Machine: Toward a Political 
Economy of Place, 82 Am. J. Soc. 309 (1976). 
85. Logan & Molotch, supra note 11, at 62–85. 
86. Charles M. Tiebout, A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures, 64 J. Pol. Econ. 416, 417–
18 (1956). 
87. Id. 
88. Id. 
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Paul Peterson’s City Limits builds on Tiebout’s competition 
model but suggests that Tiebout misidentified the audience to 
which local government plays. Peterson recognizes that in reality, 
residents are much less mobile than Tiebout assumes. Further-
more, he concedes that a city’s fiscal revenue is tied in large part to 
land use, either directly through property taxes or indirectly 
through income or labor taxes derived from firms engaged in pro-
ductive land use.89 For these reasons, Peterson explains, local 
politicians play to industry, not residents: “cities constantly seek to 
upgrade their economic standing” by increasing their “attractive-
ness as a locale for economic activity.”90 An advantageous economic 
position gives a city a competitive edge over competing locales, be-
cause the city becomes a net exporter of goods and an importer of 
labor and capital, tools that allow the local economy to flourish.91 
From this economic analysis, Peterson concludes that “it is only 
a modest oversimplification to equate the interests of cities with 
the interests of their export industries. Whatever helps them pros-
per redounds to the benefit of the community as a whole—perhaps 
four and five times over.”92 Local politicians naturally gravitate to-
ward the interests of local businessmen and entrepreneurs, 
encouraging policies that make the city more attractive for growth 
and investment—and because the benefits of growth trickle down 
through the local economy, most city residents benefit from and 
support these goals.93 
Logan and Molotch agree that growth is the all-consuming goal 
of local government, but they question the source of this trend and 
criticize sharply Peterson’s unbounded optimism in its effect.94 The 
Growth Machine is rooted in what the authors describe as a natural 
tension between exchange value, the value derived by exchanging a 
parcel on the open market, and use value, the value derived from 
the use of the parcel. Economic development is thought to in-
                                                   
89. Tiebout seemed to dance around the growth thesis. Although his essay focused on 
a city reaching optimum size, he admits that “[t]he case of the city that is too large and tries 
to get rid of residents is more difficult to imagine” and that “[n]o alderman in his right 
political mind would ever admit that the city is too big.” Id. at 420. 
90. Paul E. Peterson, City Limits 22 (1981). 
91. Id. at 22–23. Peterson’s claim is reflected in the quotation often attributed to CEO 
Charles Wilson, that “what’s good for GM is good for America.” For background on Mr. 
Wilson’s quotation, see Elizabeth T. Lear, National Interests, Foreign Injuries, and Federal Forum 
Non Conveniens, 41 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 559, 601 n.191 (2007). 
92. Id. at 23. Peterson distinguishes a city’s export industry from goods and services 
produced for merely local consumption. These, he says, do not have the same multiplier 
effect: “Residents, in effect, are simply taking in one another’s laundry. Unless productivity 
increases, there is no capacity for expansion.” Id. 
93. See id. 
94. Logan & Molotch, supra note 11, at 33–34. 
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crease the exchange values of land, by dedicating land to a more 
intensive use. As a result, the Growth Machine, whose proponents 
benefit from rising exchange values, pursues government policies 
that will attract capital to the city, intensify land uses, and increase 
exchange values.95 But rising exchange values often hurt existing 
residents, whose use values are upset by increasing rents and high 
turnover in land use.96 To prevent these residents from derailing its 
development goals, the Growth Machine erects barriers to opposi-
tion: “When residents’ claims on behalf of use values threaten to 
undermine growth, government can turn back the challenge,  
either by invoking police power or by distracting dissidents with 
payoffs.”97  
Logan and Molotch derive the distinction between use and 
exchange values from Karl Marx’s formulation, but the authors 
consciously develop a theory that differs in key ways from a neo-
Marxist framework. They explain that “the roll out toward capital-
ist accumulation” that characterizes typical Marxism “seemed 
brittle in its determinism” and left little room for “human agency 
and the kinds of empirical variations that people produce as they 
strive to make their lives and fortunes out of place.”98 As a result, 
the authors declined to shoehorn their sociology of place into a 
Marxist paradigm of capitalist oppression of the proletariat. Rather 
than highlight capitalists in general, the Growth Machine model 
focuses on the actions of a distinct group of “place entrepreneurs” 
and their allies who gain by intensifying land uses. And rather than 
pity the working class, the model focuses on the effects of growth 
upon “those who, of whatever class, ha[ve] land-related purposes 
of their own”—including existing capitalists within a community 
whose investments are uprooted by the desire to intensify land 
use.99 
At first glance, one might understand Logan and Molotch as in-
voking little more than a different shade of public choice theory. 
Their objection might be repackaged in public choice terms, to 
describe the Growth Machine as a special interest group that pur-
sues rent-seeking legislation aimed at economic development 
                                                   
95. Id. at 32–34. 
96. See id. at 34. 
97. Id. at 35. 
98. Id. at viii. 
99. Id. The model’s focus on the interests of specific interest-aligned groups of actors, 
rather than “capitalists” and “workers” generally, helps it avoid some of the flaws that plague 
Marxist analysis. For example, Logan and Molotch recognize that pro-growth policies may 
benefit some capitalists but hurt others—for example, those who derive value from current 
use or those in other communities who would have benefitted from additional investment 
but for the local Growth Machine’s intervention.  
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through the political process rather than the market. Existing resi-
dents lack the political resources to combat the Growth Machine, 
leading to inefficient transfers that serve the selfish desires of 
growth proponents but are a net negative to the city as a whole. 
But as one unpacks the Growth Machine hypothesis, it becomes 
clear that Logan and Molotch are asserting a very different argu-
ment. As noted above, the power of public choice theory to 
condemn rent-seeking lies in its faith in the market to distribute 
goods efficiently within society. Logan and Molotch forcefully re-
ject this normative baseline, at least as applied to land. “Places  
have a certain preciousness for their users that is not part of the 
conventional concept of a commodity.”100 Place is indispensable: all 
human activity must happen somewhere, meaning that a consumer 
cannot substitute another product for it. One can, at most, settle 
for less place or a less desirable place.101 Furthermore, “[p]lace is 
. . . not a discreet element, like a toy or even food”; the use of a 
particular place creates and sustains access to other use values, 
such as access to friends, family, and work.102 These use values are 
unique to the user and are not readily transferable, meaning they 
are not perfectly captured in a parcel’s exchange value. 
The bifurcation of exchange and use value is crucial to the 
Growth Machine hypothesis. Although significant value is attached 
to a parcel’s use, the land market responds only to exchange val-
ues. This distinction is the reason conventional economists often 
conclude that “the urban land market is a curious one.”103 Land is a 
fixed commodity, with no room for entrepreneurs to make more 
product.104 As a result, price, or exchange value, is not always de-
termined by a “balance between supply and demand . . . . [but 
instead] by competitive bidding on a fixed resource by investors 
who assume that the future price will be greater than the present 
one.”105 “This is the essence of speculation,” in which investment 
levels are often set based upon expectations of how others will re-
act in the future rather than an evaluation of a parcel’s current use 
value.106 
In this critique of the land market, one begins to realize that 
Logan and Molotch are also employing a very different conception 
of “use value” than public choice theorists. For Tullock and other 
                                                   
100. Id. at 17 (emphasis omitted). 
101. See id. at 18. 
102. Id. 
103. Id. at 23 (quoting David E. Dowall, The Suburban Squeeze 111 (1984)). 
104. Id. at 23. 
105. Id. at 26. 
106. Id. at 26–27. 
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public choice theorists, a parcel’s use value is best understood as 
the utility the current owner derives from his ownership and use of 
the land. The Growth Machine model contemplates a use value 
that is at once broader and narrower than this model. Logan and 
Molotch find use values not necessarily in a parcel’s owner, but in 
its occupant—which may or may not be the same—and others who 
derive utility from the parcel’s current use.107 The tenant’s use value 
turns on idiosyncratic locational benefits such as proximity to 
friends, work, and school. In this sense, an individual parcel’s use 
value is inextricably linked to the continuity of its surrounding 
neighborhood: location “establishes a special collective interest 
among individuals” that gives residents a common stake in the 
area’s future and creates a use value within a neighborhood that is 
greater than the sum of that neighborhood’s parts.108 
And while Logan and Molotch contemplate a variety of different 
use values that stem from different users and uses of land, they 
quickly focus upon one use value in particular as worthy of greater 
protection: the residential use value.109 Commercial interests derive 
their own use values from land, but several reasons suggest that 
they are less attached to place. Their primary interest is in the prof-
itability of operations; the strength of a capitalist’s tie to a certain 
place depends largely on how well that particular plot of land 
serves the profitability goal. When conditions change, capital is 
generally more mobile than residents and can exit the community 
more easily.110 Moreover, the use value that commercial interests 
derive is less fragile than those of residents: factories find it easier 
than residents to adapt to changes such as noise, odor, or ethnic 
succession.111 Overall, the absence of personal attachment to place 
allows entrepreneurs to react to locational changes more quickly 
and more completely than residential users.112 “The most vulner-
able participants in place markets are those with the fewest 
alternatives.”113 
As a result, one may view the Growth Machine critique as a 
condemnation of the public choice-influenced competition that 
Peterson lauded. Growth is more than a goal of some discreet 
                                                   
107. Indeed, the landlord, whose only use value is the rent he can extract from the ten-
ant, is the quintessential “place entrepreneur” whose support is crucial to the perpetuation 
of the Growth Machine. See id. at 30–31. 
108. Id. at 19. 
109. See id. at 20, 22–23. 
110. Id. at 22. 
111. Id. 
112. Id. at 22–23. 
113. Id. at 23. 
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special interest; it is a sociological phenomenon that unites the 
most powerful stakeholders in a city who would otherwise be sepa-
rated by great gulfs on other policy issues.114 “Although they may 
differ on which particular strategy will best succeed, elites use their 
growth consensus to eliminate any alternative vision of the purpose 
of local government or the meaning of community.”115  
But local growth does not make jobs, Logan and Molotch argue; 
rather, it merely redistributes them from one city to another.116 As a 
result, the competition between cities that Peterson lauds, the “bat-
tle of the growth machines,”117 more closely approximates a race to 
the bottom in which residential use values are sacrificed in a bid-
ding war for development projects. Residents can be priced out of 
the neighborhoods in which they have invested their lives, or see 
those neighborhoods razed for more intensive uses.118 Small busi-
nessmen can be bankrupted by more sophisticated competition.119 
And when the market changes, companies can simply move to the 
next town, shifting the costs of growth to those immobile residents 
who have already sacrificed so much in use value to meet the needs 
of the city’s Growth Machine.120 
The ill effects of the Growth Machine reach beyond those whose 
use values are actually disrupted. The existence of a pro-growth 
agenda also takes a psychological toll on those whose use values are 
perpetually threatened with disruption. Logan and Molotch con-
cede that growth can enhance use values, such as when a new 
employer brings lucrative jobs closer to the neighborhood or when 
a new supermarket allows residents access to goods at a lower 
cost.121 But even when growth is good, “residents ordinarily have 
little control over such changes and this contributes to the general 
                                                   
114. Id. at 32 (“[V]irtually all place entrepreneurs and their growth machine associates, 
regardless of geographical or social location, easily agree on the issue of growth itself.”); see 
also id. at 50–51. 
115. Id. at 51. 
116. Id. at 89. 
117. Id. at 35. 
118. See id. at 17–23. 
119. See id. at 23. 
120. Id.; cf. Local 1330, United Steel Workers v. U.S. Steel Corp., 631 F.2d 1264, 1280–
82 (6th Cir. 1980) (declining to create a community property right to prevent defendant 
from closing a steel mill that employed much of the community and declining to force the 
company to rehabilitate those unemployed by the closing). 
121. Logan & Molotch, supra note 11, at 111 (“Sometimes, of course, these changes 
can represent a use value gain . . . .”); id. at 85 (“The costs and benefits of growth depend on 
local circumstance.”). 
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anxiety resulting from the fact that [the Growth Machine] may well 
serve to undermine neighborhood.”122 
B. Support for Protection of Use Values 
Although Logan and Molotch derive their exchange/use value 
dichotomy from Marx,123 the idea that property should be valued 
by its use also displays shades of the Lockean theory of property. As 
discussed earlier,124 under a Lockean theory of property it is labor 
upon a parcel that creates a natural property right in the laborer.125 
If one correlates “labor” with “use,” then Locke lends moral force 
to the defender of use values: by using a parcel, Locke explains, 
one makes the land nothing less than an extension of self.126 The 
correlation between Lockean “labor” and Marxian “use” becomes 
stronger when one considers Locke’s sufficiency proviso. For 
Locke, the natural right to property attaches only as long as the 
user leaves “enough, and as good” property in the common for 
others, so that one’s use of a particular parcel does not deprive 
others of the ability to do the same. In other words, a parcel’s use 
value is defined by and inextricably intertwined with the effect of 
that use upon the use values of others in the community.127 And 
while use creates a natural right, Locke finds that exchange is 
merely a social construct: the reduction of labor to a medium of ex-
change is no more than a condition of entrance to society, as a way 
to defeat the prohibition on owning more than one can consume 
without spoilage.128 
One also sees shades of the importance of use value in certain 
Supreme Court opinions discussing property as a personal right. 
                                                   
122. Id. at 111. Moreover, even when the Growth Machine brings development that im-
proves the city as a whole, it visits costs upon those residents whose use values were disrupted 
and does not guarantee that those affected residents benefit in the community’s gain. For 
example, a low-income resident whose housing unit is demolished for a new factory may be 
forced to leave the city to find a new home and would not be able to partake in the eco-
nomic prosperity the factory promises. 
123. See, e.g., id. at 1 & n.1 (“We derive the distinction between use and exchange values 
from Marx’s original formulation . . . .”). 
124. See supra text accompanying notes 94–95. 
125. Locke, supra note 13, at 19. 
126. Id. at 25. 
127. Id. at 21. 
128. Id. at 29–30. One should not overstate the parallels between Locke and Marx. 
Nonetheless, the labor theory of value provides a property right as a reward for intensifying 
land use, making a parcel productive, a goal that can be understood as aligning with the 
interests of a Growth Machine. Id. at 21–23. Moreover, Locke asserts that “the increase of 
lands, and the right employing of them, is the great art of government,” implying a positive role 
for government in intensifying land use. Id. at 26 (emphasis added). 
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Logan and Molotch for the most part dismiss American constitu-
tional law as a framework for capitalist expansion: Urban Fortunes 
specifically criticizes the Takings Clause because the just compensa-
tion requirement sustains the “commodity status of land.”129 
Similarly, substantive due process generally protects property only 
insofar as it guarantees a “reasonable return on investment.”130 But 
despite this critique, the Court has at times hinted at the impor-
tance of property rights as a way to safeguard use values, and of the 
need to preserve a sphere of autonomy for the way residents use 
land. In Lynch v. Household Finance Corp.,131 Justice Stewart wrote 
that:  
[T]he dichotomy between personal liberties and property 
rights is a false one. Property does not have rights. People 
have rights. The right to enjoy property without unlawful dep-
rivation, no less than the right to speak or the right to travel, 
is in truth, a “personal” right . . . . In fact, a fundamental in-
terdependence exists between the personal right to liberty 
and the personal right in property. Neither could have mean-
ing without the other. That rights in property are basic civil 
rights has long been recognized.132 
In Department of Agriculture v. Moreno,133 the Court hinted at a 
right to choose with whom one could live, by condemning a Food 
Stamp Act limitation that denied benefits to households of “non-
related” individuals and was “specifically aimed at the ‘hippies’ and 
‘hippie communes.’ ”134 This liberty interest was made more explicit 
in Moore v. City of East Cleveland,135 which invalidated a housing or-
dinance limiting occupancy of a dwelling unit to nuclear families.136 
Each of these cases suggests a constitutionally-protected value 
not just in the possession and exchange of land, but in its use, par-
ticularly in residential uses that Logan and Molotch struggle to 
                                                   
129. Logan & Molotch, supra note 11, at 27. 
130. Id.; see also Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York, 438 U.S. 104, 121 (1976) 
(“Whether or not there was a denial of substantive due process turned on whether the re-
strictions deprived Penn Central of a ‘reasonable return’ on the [operation] of the 
Terminal.”). 
131. 405 U.S. 538 (1972). 
132. Id. at 552. 
133. 413 U.S. 528 (1973). 
134. Id. at 537. 
135. 431 U.S. 494 (1977). 
136. Id. at 496. Indeed, Justice Stevens’ concurrence in the judgment tied this liberty in-
terest directly back to the Takings Clause: “East Cleveland’s unprecedented ordinance 
constitutes a taking of property without due process and without just compensation.” Id. at 
521 (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment). 
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protect. Margaret Radin argues that Moore demonstrates an inextri-
cable link between property and personhood:137 “to achieve proper 
self-development—to be a person—an individual needs some con-
trol over resources in the external environment.”138 Radin writes 
that certain spaces like the home are reflections of and integral to 
one’s personhood; as a result, these areas should receive greater 
protection from city zoning and eminent domain powers, to create 
a zone of self-expression through the use of property to shape 
one’s daily life.139  
C. The Growth Machine and Eminent Domain 
To the extent that Urban Fortunes criticizes the government’s role 
in the Growth Machine, it focuses its attention upon the way gov-
ernment shapes the public agenda to address issues important to 
maintaining an investment-friendly culture (such as controlling 
crime and advertising the city abroad), programs that co-opt or 
pacify growth opponents, and zoning as a way to attract invest-
ment.140 Logan and Molotch do not discuss eminent domain in any 
significant detail, but their concern with defending residential use 
values from the Growth Machine provides substantial insight into 
modern takings law. 
Although it is an imperfect tool, the exclusive right to alienation 
is an important stick in the bundle of individual property rights 
because of its ability to defend at least some use values enveloped 
within a parcel. When a proposed development threatens to dis-
rupt a neighborhood’s use values, affected landowners can simply 
refuse to sell their parcels and preserve their neighborhood from 
greater intensification at the hands of the Growth Machine. This 
solution is imperfect because, as noted above, use values are in part 
collective and are therefore susceptible to a collective action prob-
lem: if a significant minority of landowners within the 
neighborhood agrees to sell, they can significantly diminish the 
community use value in the remaining parcels. But both formal 
and informal methods exist to alleviate this problem: formally, 
neighborhood landowners can agree to covenants binding their 
                                                   
137. Margaret Jane Radin, Property and Personhood, 34 Stan. L. Rev. 957, 1012 n.199 
(1982). 
138. Id. at 957 (emphasis omitted). 
139. Id. at 1005–06 & n.172. 
140. See Logan & Molotch, supra note 11, at 27. 
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individual properties in a way that protects existing uses.141 Infor-
mally, the social networks fostered within a neighborhood can 
prove strong enough to deter (or in extreme cases punish) defec-
tion. One of the foundational assumptions of Urban Fortunes is the 
idea that “people tend, in their market behavior as everywhere 
else, toward coalition and organization.”142 The stronger the use 
values prevalent in a neighborhood, the stronger will be these in-
formal organizations that defend those use values through 
individual refusals and collective pressure not to sell out. 
A broad public use rule undermines the protections afforded by 
the exclusive right to alienation. The expansion of “public use” to 
encompass economic development gives the local government a 
right to alienate any parcel in the city to serve its ends. As a result, 
the Takings Clause empowers a city Growth Machine to place the 
entire municipality or any part of it at the disposal of those who 
would intensify land uses.143 As the “battle of the Growth Machines” 
intensifies and developers pit cities against one another, local gov-
ernment faces ever greater pressure to dangle more parcels out as 
investment bait.144 And naturally, the parcels that successfully lure 
investment are often those that are most attractive, meaning sig-
nificant use values are destroyed by the taking. 
Thus, although Logan and Molotch dedicate substantial space to 
criticizing municipal zoning power, one could argue that the con-
demnation power is more dangerous to residential use values. 
Zoning is a large, clumsy weapon: it can dictate a change in the 
desired use of large swaths of parcels such as neighborhoods, but 
there exists a time lag between zoning and eventual development 
to match a town plan, while the zoning itself could be subject to 
grandfathered prior uses that frustrate the Growth Machine’s over-
all purpose.145 By comparison, condemnation is a much more 
surgical instrument, allowing the government to carve out with la-
                                                   
141. A prominent but notorious example of this method of preserving use values was 
the use of racially-restrictive covenants to preserve the ethnic homogeneity of many early 
twentieth-century neighborhoods. Although judicial enforcement of these covenants was 
held to be unconstitutional in Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 20 (1948), their development 
provides both a legal model of how use values may be preserved and practical evidence that 
such an approach is feasible.  
142. Logan & Molotch, supra note 11, at 9. 
143.  Cf. id. at 17–23. 
144.  See id. at 35. 
145. Cf. Town of Belleville v. Parrillo’s, Inc., 416 A.2d 388, 393 (N.J. 1980) (recognizing 
the right of a restaurant to operate in a residential zone because of its status as a prior non-
conforming use, but abrogating that right when the restaurant attempted to change its 
character to a discotheque). 
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ser-like precision the most valuable parts of a neighborhood to of-
fer as bait. 
And although the law recognizes only an injury to the victimized 
landowner (and in some cases the tenant), the taking of a particu-
lar parcel can have a ripple effect on use values throughout the 
community. When the local grocery store is condemned, residents 
lose a convenient—or even essential—local source of the staples of 
everyday life. When that grocer is replaced with a factory that 
pours smoke into the air and emits loud noises at odd hours, the 
residents bear the cost of “progress” while local place entrepre-
neurs reap the benefits of additional tax revenue and exchange 
value increases across the city.  
Nor should one overlook the larger psychological costs that such 
a rule creates. As noted above, Logan and Molotch cite with dis-
dain the insecurity that residents suffer from the knowledge that 
no matter how comfortable they are in their daily rounds, their use 
values can be disrupted at any time by the Growth Machine’s 
scheming.146 Urban Fortunes notes that renters suffer the most from 
this phenomenon because they lack any control over whether the 
parcel from which they derive use today will be available for the 
same use tomorrow. A broad public use policy expands this cate-
gory of helpless tenants to include homeowners as well as renters. 
For all residential users, the shadow of a taking hangs like the 
Sword of Damocles over their daily lives, creating a greater sense of 
insecurity than even Logan and Molotch recognized in their origi-
nal critique.147 
D. Limitations of the Growth Machine Model 
Like public choice theory, the Growth Machine model is a pow-
erful tool to describe the mechanics of the legislative process. But 
like the public choice model, it has limitations when deployed as a 
normative device. Specifically, the somewhat artificial divorce of 
                                                   
146. See supra text accompanying notes 121–122. 
147. One takings victim expressed this point rather cogently in an interview with the 
newsmagazine 60 Minutes. Jim Saleet and his wife had owned their Lakewood, Ohio home 
for 38 years when the city attempted to condemn their property to convey it to a condomin-
ium developer. Said Saleet, “I thought I bought this place. But I guess I just leased it, until 
the city wants it.” Eminent Domain: Being Abused? (CBS television broadcast Sept. 26, 2003), 
available at http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2003/09/26/60minutes/main575343.shtml. It 
is, of course, important not to overstate the magnitude of this psychological effect: although 
any property user is potentially subject to ouster by eminent domain at all times, few are 
aware of the possibility until they are personally threatened with a taking—a phenomenon 
that Mr. Saleet’s testimony demonstrates. 
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exchange and use values and the romanticization of residential use 
values lead to criticism of many socially efficient transfers of prop-
erty and can ignore the problems that some residential uses may 
cause. 
While the Growth Machine thesis recognizes that place is indis-
pensable and all human activity must happen somewhere, it 
seemingly does not offer a device by which one may determine 
which activities should happen in which places. More specifically, by 
disaggregating a parcel’s use and exchange values, Logan and 
Molotch downplay the interaction between the two values in the 
creation of a good’s price. This decision is conscious: in the 
Growth Machine view, place entrepreneurs seek to manipulate 
price by holding land for the purpose of increasing exchange val-
ues, rather than because they extract any underlying use value 
from the parcel.148  
One cannot doubt that speculators exist, particularly in the land 
market. But as Frederich Hayek noted long ago, prices also serve as 
a conduit by which widely dispersed information about the value of 
a commodity may be communicated.149 In other words, price is the 
exchange value for which the owner is willing to sacrifice his use 
value in the commodity and also the exchange value that a poten-
tial buyer is willing to pay to acquire a use value in the commodity. 
In this way, price signals the relative importance of different poten-
tial buyers’ use values, and facilitates the transfer of goods to its 
most valued (and therefore presumably its most socially beneficial) 
use.150 Indeed, Logan and Molotch recognize that many such trans-
fers are socially beneficial and enhance use values of neighboring 
parcels.151 Yet they eschew this mechanism for sorting among com-
peting uses for scarce land, without offering another model to 
determine which takings, if any, are socially beneficial. 
Relatedly, the theory’s romanticization of the residential use 
value fails to account for the negative externalities of some residen-
tial uses. While Logan and Molotch recognize that the relationship 
between interlocking parcels can enhance use values, they pay little 
attention to the fact that this relationship can also subtract from 
use values. The “taverns” and “bookie joints” in poor neighbor-
hoods may enhance residential use values just as the analogous 
restaurants do in more affluent neighborhoods by providing de-
                                                   
148. See Logan & Molotch, supra note 11, at 32–34. 
149. See Friedrich A. Hayek, The Use of Knowledge in Society, 35 Am. Econ. Rev. 519, 526 
(1945). 
150. See id. 
151. See Logan & Molotch, supra note 11, at 111; supra text accompanying note 117. 
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manded services to local residents.152 But to the extent that they 
also spawn criminal activity, their existence may reduce the value a 
nearby resident derives from use of his parcel. By failing to account 
for these nuisances and other negative externalities, the Growth 
Machine theory again offers an imperfect measurement of the 
normative value of a particular taking. 
Therefore, like public choice theory, the Growth Machine hy-
pothesis is a strong descriptive model but has some drawbacks as a 
comprehensive normative theory. But despite this flaw, it too 
proves a useful lens through which to examine particular exercises 
of the condemnation power. When deployed in this capacity, the 
Growth Machine model highlights two particular points that are 
often overlooked in the eminent domain debate. First, every effort 
to improve a community by intensifying land use has victims. Even 
where the goal is urban renewal—ostensibly to improve the quality 
of life for the city’s poor generally—the particular residents who 
currently live in the condemned tract suffer tremendous life dis-
ruptions that typically are not compensated by current 
condemnation jurisprudence. Second, communities are greater 
than the sums of their parts. A city’s social value depends in part 
upon the lattice of interlocking use values between parcels, and 
this common value rarely enters the calculus of individual devel-
opment decisions despite the ripple effect that such a decision can 
have upon the community as a whole. 
IV. Defining the Problem: Three Case Studies 
Both public choice theory and the Growth Machine hypothesis 
express concern with the broad power conveyed to local govern-
ment by the current takings doctrine. But their differing 
approaches, one marked by strong faith in markets and the other 
by protectionist concerns for residents, lead to nuanced differ-
ences when each is applied to the facts of a particular case. This 
section applies these theoretical approaches to three (in)famous 
modern takings cases, Berman v. Parker, Hawaii Housing Authority v. 
Midkiff, and Poletown Neighborhood Council v. Detroit, to sort out the 
doctrinal distinctions between them and assess the usefulness of 
each as a theoretical lens. 
                                                   
152. Id. at 113. 
Lyons FTP Paginated_4_C.doc  2/19/2009 2:25 PM 
296 University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform [Vol. 42:2 
A. Blight Elimination and Slum Clearance: Berman v. Parker 
As discussed briefly above, Berman involved a public use chal-
lenge to the District of Columbia Redevelopment Act of 1945.153 
Section 2 of the Act declared Congress’s finding that: 
[O]wing to technological and sociological changes, obsolete 
lay-out, and other factors, conditions existing in the District of 
Columbia with respect to substandard housing and blighted 
areas, including the use of buildings in alleys as dwellings for 
human habitation, are injurious to the public health, safety, 
morals, and welfare, and it is hereby declared to be the policy 
of the United States to protect and promote the welfare of the 
inhabitants of the seat of the Government by eliminating all 
such injurious conditions by employing all means necessary 
and appropriate for the purpose.154 
Furthermore, Congress declared that “these ends cannot be at-
tained ‘by the ordinary operations of private enterprise alone 
without public participation’ ”; curing the blight required “com-
prehensive and coordinated planning of the whole of the territory 
of the District of Columbia and its environs.”155 
To solve this problem, the Act authorized the National Capital 
Planning Commission to develop a land use plan for the district 
and to use the condemnation power to engage in targeted rede-
velopment of specific areas.156 In accordance with that plan, the 
Commission carved out a particularly blighted area of southwest 
Washington for condemnation, a largely residential area in which 
64.3 percent of the dwellings were “beyond repair” and an addi-
tional 18.4 percent required “major repairs” to be inhabitable.157 
Under authority of the Act, the Commission initiated condemna-
tion proceedings within this area. 
The Commission’s action was challenged by the owner of a de-
partment store within the area to be condemned.158 The plaintiff 
seemed to concede the validity of a taking for the purpose of slum 
clearance, and challenged only the extension of the commission’s 
                                                   
153. Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 28 (1954); see also D.C. Code §§ 5-701 to -709 
(1951). 
154. Berman, 348 U.S. at 28 (quoting D.C. Code § 5-701). 
155. Id. at 29 (quoting D.C. Code § 5-701). 
156. See id. at 29–30. 
157. Id. at 30. 
158. Id. at 31. 
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power to include his store, which was not a “slum.”159 In a unani-
mous opinion, the Supreme Court refused to engage in such hair-
splitting, adopting instead a rule granting substantial deference to 
the legislature’s determination of a “public use” and holding that 
“[t]he role of the judiciary in determining whether that power is 
being exercised for a public purpose is an extremely narrow 
one.”160 Because regulation of public safety fell within the tradi-
tional police power of the states, the legislature had enunciated a 
sufficient public purpose so as to satisfy the Fifth Amendment’s 
public use requirement.161 
1. The Public Choice View 
For purposes of this Article, the doctrinally interesting portion 
of Berman is not the plaintiff’s claim of excess condemnation, but 
whether eminent domain should be used for purposes of slum 
clearance and blight elimination. As noted above, the strength of 
public choice theory’s normative claims as applied to eminent do-
main turn upon one’s view of the strength of markets.162 One could 
argue that this problem is better entrusted to the market than gov-
ernment on one of two theories. First, one might assume that with 
sufficient time the market will devise a solution to the blight prob-
lem, and preemptive government action retards the process. 
Second, one might assume that slum housing is in fact the most 
efficient use for the area proposed for condemnation: the poor 
must live somewhere, and human ecology has forced them from 
more valuable parcels elsewhere to the southwestern quadrant of 
our nation’s capital.163 But both of these arguments are speculative 
and somewhat circular, in that they cite the result of market trans-
actions as evidence of the infallibility of those transactions, without 
explaining why the market’s result is superior to the planning 
commission’s alternative vision. 
More likely, public choice theory would have difficulty con-
demning slum clearance as inefficient rent-seeking because of the 
strong case that such action is necessary to correct a market failure. 
                                                   
159. Id. (“To take for the purpose of ridding the area of slums is one thing; it is quite 
another, the argument goes, to take a man’s property merely to develop a better balanced, 
more attractive community.”). 
160. Id. at 32. 
161. Id. at 32–33. 
162. See supra text accompanying notes 72–74. 
163. See Logan & Molotch, supra note 11, at 4–8 (summarizing the tenets of the hu-
man ecology school). 
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In its statement of purpose, Congress specifically declared that 
these properties represented a threat to the public and that the 
market was incapable of providing an adequate private remedy.164 
The concern is rooted in nuisance: Slums are breeding grounds 
for disease and crime, which have ill effects on neighboring par-
cels. Private tort law provides an inadequate remedy because the 
property owners are often judgment-proof. Furthermore, like use 
values, the nuisances generated by each parcel feed on one an-
other. A prospective buyer cannot simply purchase a lot and hope 
to restore it, because the causes of nuisance transcend individual 
parcels; the lot would be burdened by nuisances from neighboring 
properties that the buyer would be powerless to correct.  
Because nuisances are externalities whose costs are inadequately 
internalized through the private tort system, the state may use its 
police power to minimize or prevent nuisance-causing behavior. As 
Berman suggests, the condemnation of blighted areas is nothing 
more than the exercise of that police power through the means of 
eminent domain. Because the Act corrects a market failure, and 
because the purpose of the legislation is not so much to secure an 
extra-market transfer of property as much as it is to protect mar-
kets from the deleterious effects of nuisances, public choice 
theorists would have trouble criticizing Berman as socially ineffi-
cient (however much they may condemn the broad legislative 
deference that has been the effect of Berman in practice).  
Indeed, many who oppose broad eminent domain powers on 
the ground that they allow private entities to capture the regula-
tory process nonetheless concede the state’s power to engage in 
blight-curing takings. In his famous Poletown dissent, Justice Ryan 
conceded that condemnations could occur where the land was se-
lected “according to facts of independent public significance,” 
citing slum clearance as one example.165 The Hathcock court, in 
overturning Poletown, confirmed that “condemned land may be 
transferred to a private entity when the selection of the land to be 
condemned is itself based on public concern.”166 And in the analo-
gous regulatory takings context, Justice Scalia noted that a 
regulation depriving an owner of all economically viable use of a 
parcel does not effect a taking if the regulation inheres in “the re-
                                                   
164. See Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 28–29 (1951). 
165. Poletown Neighborhood Council v. City of Detroit, 304 N.W.2d 455, 478, 480 
(Mich. 1981) (Ryan, J., dissenting) (emphasis omitted). 
166. County of Wayne v. Hathcock, 684 N.W.2d 765, 782–83 (Mich. 2004) (citation 
omitted). 
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strictions that background principles of the State’s law of property 
and nuisance already place upon land ownership.”167 
Those who have approached takings from a public choice per-
spective have struggled with the issue of blight. Ilya Somin, for 
example, has criticized the broad reach of the modern takings doc-
trine from an interest group perspective but concedes that “there 
may still be an economic rationale for using condemnation as a 
means of alleviating blight.”168 Somin’s concerns about blight are 
largely prophylactic: he correctly notes that many legislatures have 
defined “blight” so broadly that the term has in practice become 
synonymous with economic development takings,169 and that even 
condemnation of truly “blighted” neighborhoods generally bene-
fited “politically powerful development interests” rather than the 
poor residents actually suffering from the blight170—a critique that 
displays shades of Logan and Molotch’s hypothesis. Ultimately, 
Somin concludes that “where condemnation may be justifiable in 
theory, it should still be viewed with great suspicion in practice” 
and that municipalities should consider other tools to cure blight 
before resorting to the condemnation power.171 Similarly, Daniel 
Kelly has found that applying economic theories to blight “seems 
to cut in two different directions.”172 He ultimately concludes that 
“eminent domain is unlikely to cause socially undesirable transac-
tions in the context of actual blight” but that private transactions 
may be preferable because of the possibility that a city may expand 
the definition of “blight” to encompass economic development 
takings.173 
2. The Growth Machine View 
In contrast to public choice theory’s equivocation and uneasy 
acceptance of blight-related takings, the Growth Machine hypothe-
sis would condemn Berman in no uncertain terms. To Logan and 
Molotch, the District of Columbia Redevelopment Act is a typical 
                                                   
167. Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1029 (1992); see also id. (no taking if 
law “do[es] no more than duplicate the result that could have been achieved in the courts—
by adjacent landowners (or other uniquely affected persons) under the State’s law of private 
nuisance, or by the State under its complementary power to abate nuisances that affect the 
public generally, or otherwise.”) (citation omitted). 
168. Somin, supra note 41, at 270. 
169. See id. at 265–66. 
170. See id. at 269–70. 
171. Id. at 270–71. 
172. Kelly, supra note 80, at 57. 
173. Id. at 57–58. 
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and deplorable Growth Machine act: it uproots and dismantles a 
neighborhood of politically-powerless residential users, destroying 
the use value they derive from their community and scattering 
them to other locations, on the grounds that their residential use 
detracts capital from investing in the city. 
Urban Fortunes highlights the dilemma that urban poor face gen-
erally: “The crux of poor people’s urban problem is that their 
routines—indeed their very being—are often damaging to ex-
change values.”174 Poor people pay less rent than wealthier 
residents, and their lack of disposable income makes them a disfa-
vored consumer class to attract commercial activity.175 As a result, 
local officials often take an active role in stamping out poor 
neighborhoods generally, “even though the pawnshops, taverns, 
bookie joints, and so forth are as important to those without 
money as the analogous boutiques, restaurants, and corporate of-
fice complexes are to the rich.”176 Logan and Molotch condemn in 
strong terms urban revival efforts that serve as “schemes to break 
. . . this chain of complementary relationships within poor areas” 
whether it be by “clos[ing] the tavern [and] arrest[ing] the prosti-
tutes” or by “destroy[ing] a group of physical structures that serve a 
use for the useless.”177 
Urban renewal of the sort reflected in Berman takes as its starting 
point the notion that there is no value inherent in poor communi-
ties that would justify preserving them. In fact, poor people living 
in multi-family apartments with few resources and few transporta-
tion options derive greater value from their location than do their 
wealthier counterparts, who live in single-family homes and com-
mute to work or the market. The “daily round” of poor residents is 
smaller, taking them only to establishments in the neighborhood 
rather than places throughout the city. And their lack of material 
resources leads them to lean on informal neighborhood networks 
for more of their daily needs, such as a ride to a more distant loca-
tion or an emergency babysitter for the kids. Urban renewal and 
slum clearance casts these use values aside because they are not 
reflected in the exchange values of individual parcels within a 
neighborhood.  
The Berman rule, which allows physical deprivation of property 
upon the payment of an exchange value that fails to encompass 
these use values (and indeed, usually delivering even that value to 
                                                   
174. Logan & Molotch, supra note 11, at 112. 
175. Id. 
176. Id. at 113. 
177. Id. 
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slumlords rather than residents), makes the threat of disruption a 
permanent and ongoing penalty in the lives of the poor. “Whether 
it comes to imagining a family, a job search, or starting a small 
business, confronting the reality of residential instability must have 
at least some detrimental effect on the way people think about 
their lives together and make plans.”178 The reality is that all poor 
people must live somewhere; slum clearance does not eliminate the 
poor, but scatters them. A legal rule allowing the poor to face peri-
odic ejection and perpetual fear of uprooting only destabilizes the 
close-knit communities of those who rely most on such networks to 
meet the demands of everyday life. 
B. Estate Breakups: Hawaii Housing Authority v. Midkiff 
Hawaii Housing Authority v. Midkiff 179 involved a statute that 
sought to dismantle the rather curious structure of the Hawaii land 
market, a legacy of the state’s not-too-distant history as a feudal 
kingdom. Before the statute had passed, 96 percent of the land in 
the state was held either by the government or by a handful of 
wealthy families who, for tax reasons, preferred to lease their lands 
to residents rather than sell it outright.180 The Hawaii state legisla-
ture faulted this oligopolistic market structure for “skewing the 
State’s residential fee simple market, inflating land prices, and in-
juring the public tranquility and welfare.”181 
As a result, the state passed a statute permitting tenants to apply 
to the Hawaii Housing Authority to condemn the land upon which 
they lived and transfer title from the landowner to the tenant. 
When a critical mass of tenants filed such applications, the HHA 
would purchase the lots from the landowner at a price determined 
either by negotiation between landlord and tenant or set by con-
demnation trial, and would then sell the land to the tenant-
applicant who would acquire “full ‘right, title, and interest in the 
land.’ ”182 
                                                   
178. Id. at 114. 
179. 467 U.S. 229 (1984). 
180. Id. at 232–33; Midkiff v. Tom, 702 F.2d 788, 790 (9th Cir. 1983). 
181. Midkiff, 467 U.S. at 232 (outlining legislative findings and objectives of Land Re-
form Act of 1967, Haw. Rev. Stat. ch. 516 (1977)). 
182. Id. at 234 (quoting Haw. Rev. Stat. § 516-25 (1977 & Supp. 1983)). 
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1. The Public Choice View 
It is possible to paint Midkiff in a light that would at least give 
public choice theorists some pause. In a sense, the statute can be 
considered a response to the failure of a land market to develop in 
the state of Hawaii. The market functions best when prices are de-
termined by robust and repeated exchanges between many buyers 
and many sellers. The efficiency gains of a free market hinge upon 
the pricing mechanism to convey information about the value of 
different potential users’ plans for a property. The effectiveness of 
that pricing mechanism is retarded when an oligopoly of buyers or 
sellers can distort property values and prevent parcels from settling 
naturally upon their highest and best use. 
But lurking behind Midkiff is a strong notion that, unlike the 
nuisance-curing scheme underlying Berman, this statute more closely 
resembles (in the words of the Ninth Circuit) “a naked attempt on 
the part of the state of Hawaii to take the private property of A and 
transfer it to B solely for B’s private use and benefit.”183 The 
transfer of the parcel from landowner to tenant “will result in no 
change in use of the property. The property itself is currently used 
for residential purposes. After condemnation it will be used for 
residential purposes.”184 The record reflects that the landlords 
regularly entered into leases with tenants,185 which suggests that 
tenant turnover adequately reflected the demands of the 
residential housing market. 
The scheme therefore is much closer to condemnable rent-
seeking legislation that merely transfers title—and the commensu-
rate rights of property ownership—from landlord to tenant 
without a recognizable gain to society.186 If the tenant wants title to 
the parcel upon which he lives, and the benefit of projected price 
increases over time, public choice theorists would recommend the 
tenant negotiate a fair price with the landlord that reflects the val-
ues each expects to receive from possession of the property right in 
the parcel. 
                                                   
183. Midkiff, 702 F.2d at 798. 
184. See id. at 796. 
185. Midkiff, 467 U.S. at 233 (“Indeed, the landowners claimed that the federal tax laws 
were the primary reason they previously had chosen to lease, and not sell, their lands.”). 
186. See Kochan, supra note 34, at 74. 
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2. The Growth Machine View 
By contrast, one expects that Logan and Molotch would cham-
pion a law making it easier for renters to acquire greater security in 
their current use values. More so than residential homeowners, 
renters have little control over the alienation and transformation 
of the places from which they derive use value. The Hawaii statute 
addressed this problem by granting the residents greater security 
over their parcels: the Ninth Circuit acknowledged plaintiffs’ ar-
gument that a resident would “treat the property differently 
because he knows he can stay there as long as he chooses.”187 The 
shift in title removes the power of the landlord to eject the resident 
when he suspects he can extract a greater exchange value from 
capital. And as a result it alleviates the insecurity discussed above 
under which renters live their daily lives. 
But this approval is not without a slight reservation: if the stat-
ute’s purpose is to be credited, then the devolution of control to 
hundreds or thousands of individual residents increases the chance 
that some of them will sell out to interests seeking to intensify land 
uses. Giving residents title to land means they now make decisions 
about the parcel by balancing exchange and use values; it takes 
only a handful of homeowners to sacrifice the latter for the former 
before the character and stability of a neighborhood are irrepara-
bly harmed.188 Logan and Molotch recognize this possibility, but 
note that its effects in practice are mild; “ordinarily, the exchange 
interests of [home]owners are not sufficiently significant to divide 
them from other residents.”189 
C. Economic Development: Poletown Neighborhood 
Council v. Detroit 
In many ways, the Michigan Supreme Court’s decision in Pole-
town Neighborhood Council v. Detroit190 was a precursor to Kelo, and its 
facts are an integral component of many first-year property 
courses. Shortly after announcing that it would close two outdated 
                                                   
187. Midkiff, 702 F.2d at 796–97. 
188. See, e.g., Logan & Molotch, supra note 11, at 115–16 (discussing the process of 
gentrification). 
189. Id. at 20. 
190. 304 N.W.2d 455 (Mich. 1981). “This is an extraordinary case. The reverberating 
clang of its economic, sociological, political, and jurisprudential impact is likely to be heard 
and felt for generations.” Id. at 464 (Ryan, J., dissenting). 
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Detroit factories and put 15,000 residents out of work,191 General 
Motors offered to build a new plant in the city, but only if the gov-
ernment could rapidly deliver the automaker 500 acres of “green 
field” within the city upon which to build.192 Detroit, facing an 18 
percent unemployment rate,193 had its “economic back to the wall” 
and had no choice but to comply.194 
Relying on a “quick take” law that, “[a]s written . . . made it 
nearly impossible for property owners to challenge the taking of 
their land,”195 the city undertook “the most massive and rapid relo-
cation of citizens for a private development project in U.S. 
history.”196 Detroit seized and demolished 1400 homes, 144 busi-
nesses, and 16 churches in Poletown, a close-knit neighborhood of 
politically-marginalized first- and second-generation Americans.197 
The affected property owners challenged the city’s action as a tak-
ing for private rather than public use, in contravention of the 
Michigan state constitution.198 But their pleas fell on deaf ears: the 
Michigan Supreme Court refused to question the city’s determina-
tion that “programs to alleviate and prevent conditions of 
unemployment and to preserve and develop industry and com-
merce are essential public purposes.”199 “[W]hen a legislature 
speaks,” the Court wrote, “the public interest has been declared in 
terms ‘well-nigh conclusive.’ ”200 
1. The Public Choice View 
Of the three cases analyzed in this Article, Poletown most closely 
resembles the core case that public choice theory condemns, rent-
seeking by a concentrated special interest who gives a politician 
something of value in exchange for a parcel that it otherwise would 
have to buy on the open market. Unlike in Berman and arguably in 
Midkiff, there is little room for an argument that a market failure 
                                                   
191. See id. at 460 (Fitzgerald, J., dissenting); Jeanie Wylie, Poletown: Community 
Betrayed 32 (1989).  
192. Poletown, 304 N.W.2d at 470 (Fitzgerald, J., dissenting).  
193. Id. at 465 (Ryan, J., dissenting). 
194. Id. at 467 (Ryan, J., dissenting). 
195. Wylie, supra note 191, at 55. 
196. Id. at 52 (citation omitted). 
197. Id.; Poletown, 304 N.W.2d at 470 (Ryan, J., dissenting). Poletown’s ethnic flavor was 
strong enough that Pope John Paul II visited the neighborhood during a North American 
visit. See Gary S. Vasilash, GM Detroit-Hamtramck: Slow Start but Gaining Speed, Auto. Design & 
Prod., Nov. 2001, http://www.autofieldguide.com/articles/110103.html. 
198. Poletown, 304 N.W.2d at 457. 
199. Id. at 458. 
200. Id. at 458–59 (quoting Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 32 (1954)). 
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somehow requires government intervention in the transaction be-
tween General Motors and the residents of Poletown. At most, the 
city’s condemnation power mitigates the transaction costs of nego-
tiating individually with each individual Poletown landowner. But it 
does not eliminate those costs completely, for the city still must 
make offers, process paperwork to transfer title, and litigate in the 
event that individual owners challenge either the condemnation or 
the amount offered as “just compensation.” Moreover, condemna-
tion shifts many of these transaction costs from the future owner to 
the taxpayers. Condemnation also eliminates the possibility of a 
socially inefficient holdout, but as both public choice theorists and 
Urban Fortunes attest, at least some private market remedies also 
exist to prevent holdouts from deterring a project.201 The notion 
that a vibrant community like Poletown constituted a “market fail-
ure” is less plausible here than in either of the other two cases. 
In addition, it is easier here to identify a beneficiary openly seek-
ing the “concentrated benefits” of special-interest legislation. 
Justice Ryan’s dissent takes great pains to show, consistent with the 
rent-seeking hypothesis, “the control being exercised over the 
condemnation project by General Motors.”202 The automaker’s ini-
tial offer to build within the city came with specific requirements as 
to the size and shape of the required parcel, as well as proximity to 
specified rail lines and highway routes, on a very abbreviated time-
table. Once the Poletown site had been selected, GM sent the city 
eight pages of “site-specific criteria” ranging from demolition 
schedules to required onramp construction. Although it became a 
live political issue whether GM or Detroit had selected the Pole-
town site (and therefore whether GM should be allowed to acquire 
for $8M a parcel that cost Detroit $200M to condemn), this ques-
tion was poorly-framed. By narrowing the rules of the game, GM 
had de facto decided for the city where the appropriate site would 
be.203  
As Ilya Somin has discussed in greater detail, economic devel-
opment takings such as Poletown are problematic because political 
safeguards are less likely to check governmental excesses.204 First, 
                                                   
201. See Kelly, supra note 80, at 5–7, 18–24 (discussing secret buying agents as a private 
market solution to the holdout problem); Kochan, supra note 34, at 88 (analogizing the 
tender offer in corporate law to the holdout problem); see also Logan & Molotch, supra 
note 11, at 117 (describing a casino company’s purchase of a neighborhood in Atlantic City 
by offering each landowner a fair price but conditioning sale upon the acceptance of these 
terms by every landowner within a specified time frame). 
202. Poletown, 304 N.W.2d at 468 n.6 (Ryan, J., dissenting). 
203. Id. at 467–68 (Ryan, J., dissenting); Wylie, supra note 191, at 51. 
204. See generally Somin, supra note 41. 
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the costs and benefits of the taking are difficult for the typical voter 
to gauge: unlike a bridge or a school, the benefit of “economic de-
velopment” is “a generalized contribution to the local economy 
that the average citizen often will not notice, much less be able to 
measure.”205 While Detroit residents could plainly see the construc-
tion of the new Detroit-Hamtramck plant, they could not easily 
determine how much that plant was contributing to the local 
economy—or calculate whether that contribution was greater than 
the cost of buying off and evicting Poletown’s residents. Second, 
even if these benefits could be calculated, there is a time horizon 
problem associated with its assessment: although the condemna-
tion of Poletown happened in 1981, the factory was not completed 
until 1985 and any economic benefit to the community was real-
ized only years afterward, by which time those officials responsible 
for the condemnation may no longer have been in office.206 Be-
cause the average voter is rationally ignorant of the costs and 
benefits of economic development takings, and even perfect in-
formation would likely be realized too late to punish overreaching 
politicians, public choice theorists are unlikely to trust the political 
process to separate beneficial economic development through 
condemnation from naked rent-seeking. 
In the end, macro-market dynamics demanded that General 
Motors build a factory somewhere in the United States. Absent 
Detroit’s (and other potential suitors’) ability to circumvent the 
market to deliver the automaker a significant plot of land for next 
to nothing, GM would have built where it was most efficient to do 
so. Eminent domain, coupled with other lures to attract capital to 
the city, distorted the market and allowed General Motors to use its 
political leverage to gouge Detroit for millions that many suggest 
have not and never will reap dividends.207 It is hardly surprising, as 
a result, that most public choice theorists cite Poletown as Exhibit A 
regarding the rent-seeking behavior induced by a broad definition 
of public use.208 
                                                   
205. Id. at 201–02. 
206. Id. at 202–03. 
207. See, e.g., Wylie, supra note 191. 
208. See, e.g., Timothy Sandefur, A Gleeful Obituary for Poletown Neighborhood Council 
v. Detroit, 28 Harv. J.L. & Pub. Pol’y 651 (2005) (celebrating the Michigan Supreme 
Court’s decision to overturn Poletown as “a major victory for property owners not only in that 
state, but, indirectly, throughout the United States”); Kochan, supra note 34, at 69–74. 
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2. The Growth Machine View 
The Poletown experience is also a strong endorsement of both 
the descriptive story Urban Fortunes tells about the manipulation of 
place to serve exchange values, and of the normative claims it 
makes regarding the harms that the Growth Machine inflicts on 
local residents. The company successfully played growth machines 
one against another to secure significant kickbacks as a lure for 
investment. Detroit’s local elites, divided on most other social is-
sues, united over the goal of attracting investment to boost the 
city’s sagging exchange values. And the residents of Poletown faced 
a significant disruption in their daily lives as a result of the city’s 
support for growth as an all-consuming goal. 
As Peterson predicts and Logan and Molotch lament, GM ex-
tracted significant concessions from Detroit by threatening to build 
elsewhere if its meticulous requirements were not met. In addition 
to receiving the land for a song, General Motors received signifi-
cant tax abatements for a decade or more following the plant’s 
completion. When challenged to justify these subsidies, GM re-
peatedly responded with the threat that it “was a business, not a 
charity; if its plans couldn’t be accommodated, it would have to go 
somewhere else.”209 Across town, Chrysler chief Lee Iacocca was 
unsurprised by GM’s tactics, which he discussed as fairly typical in 
the auto industry:  
Ford, when I was there, General Motors, Chrysler, all over the 
world, we would pit Ohio versus Michigan. We’d pit Canada 
versus the U.S. We’d get outright grants and subsidies in 
Spain, in Mexico, in Brazil—all kinds of grants. With my for-
mer employer (Ford), one of the last things I did was, on the 
threat of losing 2,000 jobs in Windsor, I got a $73 million 
grant outright to convert an engine plant . . . I have played 
[cities against one another] so long I’m tired of it.210 
But despite the general sentiment that General Motors was ex-
ploiting its position of advantage to extract these concessions, there 
was a broad base of public support for the condemnation through-
out Detroit.211 Businessmen and labor leaders, predisposed to 
oppose one another, united to sing the praises of the condemnation 
                                                   
209. Wylie, supra note 191, at 53. 
210. Id. at 36 (quoting Detroiters for a Rational Economy, Chrysler, the People, and the City 
(1980)). 
211. See Poletown, 304 N.W.2d 455, 471 (Mich. 1981) (Ryan, J., dissenting) (describing “a 
community-wide chorus of support for the project”). 
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plan, and were joined by local radio personalities, television sta-
tions, and newspapers.212 As Urban Fortunes explains, each of these 
local elites stood to gain from the General Motors facility: new fac-
tories would employ local subcontractors, and provide jobs to 
boost the membership rolls of the local United Auto Workers 
chapter. These jobs in turn provide greater disposable income for 
formerly unemployed residents, which they spend in local business 
establishments that increase the exchange values of those parcels. 
As Detroit raises its profile as “open for business,” the population 
slowly grows, increasing demand for other services such as hospi-
tals, law offices, and newspapers. The Growth Machine therefore 
stood strongly united in support of the GM plan. The only signifi-
cant opposition other than from Poletown’s residents came from 
consumer activist and professional GM-heckler Ralph Nader, who 
entered late in the game with the goal of limiting corporate influ-
ence but whose assistance was at most a mixed blessing in a town 
dominated by automobile interests.213 
The destruction of use values through the eradication of Pole-
town is well-documented and widely acknowledged.214 Use values 
were strong within the neighborhood: similar socioeconomic 
backgrounds and the neighborhood’s century-long history as an 
ethnic enclave housing Detroit’s Polish community gave the local-
ity a shared sense of identity.215 The strength of Poletown residents’ 
attachment to place is reflected in the ferociousness with which 
residents defended their homes, and in the rapid organization and 
tenacity of the Poletown Neighborhood Council. Despite a paucity 
of resources, few local allies, and virtually no prior experience, 
Poletown’s informal networks quickly wove themselves into a col-
lective entity that held sit-ins, punished defectors within the 
neighborhood (such as the local Catholic church that accepted the 
city’s condemnation offer to avoid social unrest and bloodshed), 
and fought a legal battle all the way to the Michigan Supreme 
Court.216 
Given this framework, it is not a surprise that the condemnation 
and sale of Poletown to General Motors was almost a foregone 
                                                   
212. Id.; see Wylie, supra note 191, at 84–109. Wylie describes in great detail the way lo-
cal media moved in lock-step with GM and punished maverick reporters who did not toe the 
growth line. See id. at 92–102. Logan and Molotch would be completely unsurprised by this 
assessment; both in theory and throughout history, local media has proven a cornerstone 
essential to the success of a Growth Machine. Logan & Molotch, supra note 11, at 70–73. 
213. See Wylie, supra note 191, at 110–14. 
214. See generally id. 
215. See supra note 197 and accompanying text. 
216. See Wylie, supra note 191, at 59–83. 
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conclusion the moment it was announced. The real surprise is that 
the Poletown Neighborhood Council managed to mount as much 
resistance as it did. Of course, it was ultimately a pyrrhic victory for 
those residents: even as the case was being litigated, more and 
more landowners accepted the city’s terms for their land, lured by 
the carrot of compensation and fearful of the stick of condemna-
tion.217 With each defector, use values within the neighborhood 
began to unravel, undermining the cause for which the PNC was 
fighting. The Poletown decision and the subsequent forcible evic-
tion of the neighborhood’s remaining holdouts was only the final 
straw, the last vestige of community snuffed out by Detroit’s des-
perate bid to alleviate falling exchange values across the city—an 
economic crisis to which General Motors had contributed, and 
from which it would now collect.218 
V. Finding Common Ground for Meaningful Reform 
In some situations, public choice theory and the Growth 
Machine model offer widely disparate prescriptions for the use of 
the eminent domain power—each proffers recommendations that 
the other finds somewhat uncomfortable. Public choice theorists at 
least grudgingly support some authority to condemn truly blighted 
properties to solve nuisances generated by judgment-proof 
defendants;219 Growth Machine proponents abhor the very notion 
that certain land uses are less important because they adversely 
affect neighboring exchange values, or that poor tenants should 
receive any less protection from the ill effects of condemnation 
than their wealthier counterparts.220 Similarly, Growth Machine 
proponents support Midkiff-type takings that transfer ownership 
rights and control from landlords to tenants;221 public choice 
theorists find it hard to justify a taking as a “public use” where the 
use in question does not change after the taking.222  
These disagreements are driven largely by the differing, and 
contradictory, approaches each theory takes toward the land mar-
ket. Public choice theorists believe price tracks land use and place 
great faith in the market to distribute land uses efficiently, while 
Growth Machine proponents suggest land prices are driven by 
                                                   
217. See id. at 82–83. 
218. See id. 
219. See supra text accompanying notes 162–173. 
220. See supra text accompanying notes 174–178. 
221. See supra text accompanying notes 187–189. 
222. See supra text accompanying notes 183–186. 
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speculation and are largely unaffected by a parcel’s current use or 
the use demands of the community’s residents.223 In reality, land 
prices likely represent some mixture of the potential uses for a 
parcel and speculation-driven assessments of local land scarcity. 
One’s decision to analyze a particular taking through one lens or 
the other depends in part upon the extent to which the parcel’s 
price correlates to its present and prospective use values. 
From the perspective of shaping overall condemnation policy, 
however, these doctrinal differences are less interesting than the 
surprising amount of common ground the two models share. De-
spite approaching the issue from diametrically opposite 
perspectives, both theories find Kelo a wildly unsatisfying decision 
as a matter of policy.224 Economic development takings such as Kelo 
and Poletown are likely to do more harm than good, by displacing 
existing residents without adequate compensation in pursuit of 
growth that quite possibly may never materialize—or does so at the 
detriment of another community equally situated. 
Similarly, and perhaps also surprisingly, both models find the 
post-Kelo legislative response to be underwhelming. Most states 
have failed to adopt measures that would correct the excesses of 
economic development takings or provide sufficient protection to 
residents displaced by condemnation. Achieving lasting change 
requires more substantive reforms than most states have adopted 
thus far, including more robust procedural requirements to assure 
that initiatives are truly for a “public use.” Both models also suggest 
greater cooperation between the legislative and judicial branches 
to develop and enforce these new limitations. 
A. Assessing the Post-Kelo Backlash 
As noted in the introduction, over forty states and the federal 
government have enacted some type of legislation to limit eminent 
domain’s reach.225 In some cases, these reforms have taken mean-
ingful steps to curb economic development takings similar to those 
presented in Kelo. South Dakota, for example, now categorically 
prohibits government agencies from taking private property “for 
transfer to any private person, nongovernmental entity, or other 
public-private business entity” and further requires the agency to 
offer the original owner a right of repurchase (at the lesser of fair 
                                                   
223. See supra text accompanying notes 64–68, 140–147. 
224. See supra text accompanying notes 201–218. 
225. See Somin, supra note 7, at 1; see generally Sandefur, supra note 10. 
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market value or the condemnation price) if the agency seeks to sell 
the parcel within seven years of condemnation.226 Similarly, New 
Mexico has revised its Metropolitan Redevelopment Code to ex-
plicitly exclude eminent domain from the powers a municipality 
may use to promote economic development and precludes the use 
of condemnation to cure blight.227 
Unfortunately, however, the language of many post-Kelo statutes 
may prove largely ineffective in practice at controlling the very tak-
ings that gave rise to the backlash. In most cases, this 
ineffectiveness is due to the preservation (or creation) of broad 
exceptions for “blighted” areas and other devices that preserve the 
power to conduct economic development takings under a different 
name.228 Several states that enacted post-Kelo reforms explicitly de-
fine blight to include conditions that “impair or arrest sound 
growth” or constitute an “economic or social liability,”229 terms that 
are synonymous with an economic development rationale. In many 
other states, the statutory definition of blight is not so explicitly 
tied to growth but could be read broadly enough to include eco-
nomic development takings. For example, Illinois defines blighted 
areas as areas “detrimental” to “public safety, health, or welfare” 
because of a combination of five factors from a list that could de-
scribe buildings in any community, such as obsolescence, 
inadequate utilities, “excessive” land coverage, lack of adequate 
ventilation, or lack of community planning.230 These terms are suf-
ficiently malleable to permit the condemnation of many parcels 
whose current uses are not “blighted” in a traditional sense. And 
                                                   
226. S.D. Codified Laws § 11-7-22.1 to -22.2 (2007). 
227. See H.B. 393, 48th Leg. (N.M. 2007) (“A municipality shall have all the powers, 
other than the power of eminent domain” to carry out Redevelopment Code.). 
228. See Somin, supra note 7, at 17. 
229. Alaska Stat. § 18.55.950 (2004) (containing both “impairs or arrests the sound 
growth” and “economic or social liability”); Colo. Rev. Stat. § 31-25-103(2) (2006) (con-
taining both “impairs or arrests sound growth” and “economic or social liability”); Mo. Rev. 
Stat. § 100.310(2) (1994) (containing “economic or social liability”); Mont. Code Ann. 
§ 7-15-4206(2) (2007) (containing both “impairs or arrests the sound growth” and “eco-
nomic or social liability”); Neb. Rev. Stat. § 18-2103(11) (1997) (containing both “impairs 
or arrests sound growth” and “economic or social liability”); N.C. Gen. Stat. § 160A-503 
(2007) (containing “impairs the sound growth”); Tex. Local Gov. Code § 374.002 (1987) 
(containing both “impair the sound growth” and “economic and social liability”); Vt. Stat. 
Ann. tit. 24, § 3201 (2007) (containing “impair or arrest growth”); W. Va. Code § 16-18-3(c) 
(2007) (containing “impairs or arrests the sound growth”). Each of these states exempts 
“blight” from its prohibition on economic development takings. The Missouri Supreme 
Court also incorporated “menace injurious to the public health, safety, morals and welfare 
of the residents” into their definition of blight. Centene Plaza Redev. Corp. v. Mint Props., 
225 S.W.3d 431, 433 (Mo. 2007) (quoting Tax Increment Financing Comm’n of Kan. City v. 
J.E. Dunn Constr. Co, 781 S.W.2d 70, 78 (Mo. 1989)). 
230. See 65 Ill. Comp. Stat. § 5/11-74.4-3 (1993 & Supp. 2005). 
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while Pennsylvania now prohibits “the exercise by any condemnor 
of the power of eminent domain to take private property in order 
to use it for private enterprise,”231 this prohibition exempts Phila-
delphia and Pittsburgh, the two most prominent places in the state 
where economic development takings would occur.232 
1. Political Ineffectiveness from a Public Choice Perspective 
Although this ineffectiveness may seem peculiar given the level 
of public disdain for Kelo, public choice theorists are unsurprised 
that substantive reform has proven difficult to accomplish. Devel-
opers have strong incentive to preserve the perk of securing and 
assembling parcels at below-market rates. Individual landowners 
subject to takings suffer substantial disadvantages in the market for 
political favors.233 And although economic development condem-
nations are common, the odds that any individual landowner will 
fall victim to such a taking is trivial, meaning that individual home-
owners have little incentive to invest heavily in rent-seeking 
behavior to combat the developers’ lobby.234 As a result, Timothy 
Sandefur concludes that:  
Public choice theory predicts that the Kelo decision will cause 
politicians to holler out for reform as loudly as necessary to 
appease outraged constituents, and perhaps pass ineffectual 
measures designed to allay their outrage, but not to accom-
plish any substantial reform. Once the hue and cry has died 
down, the eminent domain industry can return to its old hab-
its.235 
Ilya Somin cites voters’ rational ignorance as another potential 
explanation for this ineffectiveness. Somin suggests that most vot-
ers are “rationally ignorant” of the details of public policy generally 
because they have “little incentive to acquire any substantive 
knowledge about the details of government actions.”236 If a voter’s 
primary goal in seeking information about an issue is to ensure 
that his vote helps secure his preferred outcome, there is little real 
                                                   
231. 26 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 204 (2007). 
232. Id. § 203(b); see Dana Berliner, Public Power, Private Gain 3, 179–82 (2003) 
(chronicling recent economic development condemnation actions in Philadelphia and 
Pittsburgh). 
233. See supra text accompanying notes 62–64. 
234. See Sandefur, supra note 10, at 770–71. 
235. Id. at 772. 
236. Somin, supra note 7, at 4. 
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incentive for the voter to seek this information because the odds 
that his single vote will decide the issue is “infinitesimally small.”237 
Prior to the Kelo decision, voters were more rationally ignorant of 
the possibility that economic development takings occurred. Al-
though Kelo raised public awareness of the issue, voters still lack the 
incentive to closely follow the details of legislative reforms enacted 
in the wake of the decision.238 As Somin explains, the rational igno-
rance hypothesis helps explain how economic development takings 
flourished prior to Kelo despite widespread public opposition to 
the practice.239 It also helps explain why the backlash is seemingly 
ineffective: because the average voter lacks the time or inclination 
to examine the details of various legislative proposals, “it would not 
be difficult for state legislators to seek to satisfy voter demands by 
supporting ‘position-taking’ legislation that purported to curb 
eminent domain, while in reality having little effect. In this way, 
they can simultaneously cater to public outrage over Kelo and mol-
lify developers and other interest groups that benefit from 
economic development condemnations.”240 
Though they tell different stories, Sandefur and Somin largely 
present the two sides of the public choice calculus.241 Sandefur 
stresses the incentives developers have to preserve their concen-
trated benefits, while Somin focuses upon the disincentive voters 
have to educate themselves regarding the burden of dispersed 
costs. Both agree that, regardless of which factor is the bigger 
driver in this equation, the political process is unlikely alone to 
correct the economic development takings problem and restore 
the law to the normative result they would prefer. 
2. Political Ineffectiveness from a Growth Machine Perspective  
The Urban Growth Machine model also notes the difficulty of 
reforming policies to control the Growth Machine. Logan and 
Molotch explain that the Growth Machine is willing to placate the 
use value interests of residents, but only insofar as doing so does 
not infringe upon its growth goal. “When residents’ claims on be-
half of use values threaten to undermine growth, the government 
                                                   
237. Id. 
238. See id. at 4. 
239. See id. at 51–52. 
240. Id. at 52. 
241. See id. at 54–55 (“Political ignorance is the handmaiden of interest group power in 
the political process. Absent widespread ignorance, interest groups at odds with the majority 
of the general public would find it more difficult to block eminent domain reform.”). 
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can turn back the challenge, either by invoking police power or by 
distracting dissidents with payoffs.”242  
Post-Kelo reforms largely fit this model. States responded to resi-
dential outcries by adopting symbolic reforms, but were careful to 
exempt from these reforms limits upon the Growth Machine’s 
power to maximize exchange values through condemnation. This 
tendency is perhaps most explicit in the states discussed above 
whose reforms explicitly include or retain the power to remedy 
threats to “sound growth” and conditions of “economic or social 
liability.”243 Such terms unambiguously communicate to residents 
that the Growth Machine has no intention of placing substantive 
limits upon its pursuit of a pro-growth agenda.  
Moreover, even those states that successfully limit economic de-
velopment condemnations continue to permit takings to cure 
blight. These reforms preserve the Growth Machine’s authority to 
adjust the urban landscape in instances of “deterioration of site 
improvements,” “juvenile delinquency and crime,” “obsolescence,” 
or “tax or special assessment delinquency exceeding the fair value 
of the land,” or similar definitions. This vocabulary perpetuates the 
Growth Machine’s commoditization of land and further structures 
land use law in ways that preserve and promote exchange values 
rather than use values. The general abdication of authority to en-
gage in economic development takings—in stark contrast with the 
seemingly unquestioned preservation of power to eliminate 
blight—serves only to isolate the urban poor from wealthier and 
more politically powerful residents. Thus as Logan and Molotch 
predict, the Growth Machine has, at most, distracted its most trou-
blesome residents with payoffs while preserving as much power as 
possible to continue to promote a pro-growth agenda. In the proc-
ess, this isolation and preservation of blight-curing authority 
highlights the normative thrust of Urban Fortunes, that poor urban 
residents are particularly vulnerable to the Growth Machine: “[t]he 
crux of poor people’s urban problem is that their routines—
indeed their very being—are often damaging to exchange val-
ues.”244  
                                                   
242. Logan & Molotch, supra note 11, at 35. 
243. See supra text accompanying note 229. 
244. Logan & Molotch, supra note 11, at 112. 
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B. Toward Meaningful Limits on the Condemnation Power 
Although some states have succeeded in enacting meaningful 
eminent domain reform, both public choice theorists and Growth 
Machine proponents would argue that more must be done to ad-
dress the negative effects of eminent domain abuse. As discussed in 
the beginning of this section, the two models have very different 
prescriptions regarding when a municipality may legitimately use 
condemnation in pursuit of a putative public use. But for different 
reasons, the two models agree on a core class of takings that should 
be prohibited as a matter of policy, and could also agree to a series 
of procedural measures designed to expose the true benefits and 
costs of condemnations undertaken within the scope of permissi-
ble takings. This minimum level of substantive and procedural 
reforms are measures upon which both left and right can agree, 
and would go far to correct the most egregious cases of eminent 
domain abuse. 
1. Substantive Limits  
First, state legislatures should take definitive steps to prohibit 
takings conducted solely for purposes of promoting economic de-
velopment. For public choice theorists, the market system of 
voluntary transactions will presumptively assure that the public is 
“using” a particular parcel in a manner that maximizes social util-
ity, by allowing it to flow to the prospective owner who derives the 
greatest value from its use. For Logan and Molotch, this exclusion 
is an important first step toward shattering the notion that the 
common good demands maximization of exchange values, and 
refocusing “public use” toward the values that the public derives 
from the “use” of a parcel.  
Second, if the polity determines that blight constitutes a per-
missible public use, the legislature should define blight using 
specific terms that focus narrowly upon the nuisance that the 
condemned tract’s current land use imposes upon its neighbor-
ing parcels rather than broad appeals to public welfare or, worse, 
sound growth and economic liability. These specific, well-defined 
terms address public choice theorists’ unease with post-Kelo blight 
condemnations by limiting the ability of local elites to shoehorn 
self-serving projects into a broad statutory mandate. And although 
Growth Machine proponents would find this limitation incom-
plete, it is at least a first step toward protecting many urban 
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residents from the threat of appropriation by limiting the reach of 
the Growth Machine’s redevelopment apparatus. 
2. Procedural Reforms  
In addition, state legislatures should impose a series of proce-
dural reforms designed to provide greater insight into the benefits 
and costs of even putatively legitimate takings, and to assure that 
displaced victims are adequately compensated for the harm done 
to them. First, states could demand as a condition of a taking that 
the municipality or redevelopment authority complete a Commu-
nity Impact Report, similar to the environmental impact reports 
that accompany many federal development projects. This report 
would describe the proposed public use and assess the likely posi-
tive and negative impacts that the project will have on community 
residents. 
From a public choice perspective, this report would alleviate the 
rational voter problem by lowering the information cost of learn-
ing a project’s expected costs and benefits. By requiring specific 
quantifiable estimates of gains and losses, the report makes it 
harder for development interests to hide the impact of a taking 
behind vague public rationales that are difficult to validate. Admit-
tedly, even this lowered information cost is still likely to be far 
greater than the cost of ignorance for the average taxpayer, mean-
ing that the average voter is likely to remain rationally ignorant of 
individual condemnations. But this lower information cost makes it 
easier for predisposed owner-victims to contest a taking. The re-
port also provides a useful benchmark against which one may later 
assess the success or failure of an individual condemnation, as a 
feedback mechanism to inform the wisdom of similar proposals in 
the future. And assuming that report is funded by the party that 
would benefit from the taking, the reporting requirement  
increases the transaction cost of a condemnation, which discour-
ages takings at the margin whose projected benefits are less certain 
and therefore less likely to cover the additional cost. 
Community Impact Reports would also find favor with Growth 
Machine proponents. Logan and Molotch praise the environ-
mental movement as being among the most successful defenders 
of use values against the Growth Machine.245 The environmental 
impact report is a significant weapon in that movement’s arsenal: it 
forces development interests to acknowledge and account for the 
                                                   
245. Id. at 215. 
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use values destroyed by their activities, and offers defenders of use 
values a procedural device by which they can challenge and stall 
development projects.246 Similarly, a Community Impact Report 
would draw greater public attention to the use values that the 
Growth Machine seeks to sacrifice in pursuit of exchange values. 
And by challenging a condemnation authority’s compliance with 
the report’s requirements, defenders of use values can delay indi-
vidual projects in an effort to avoid development or to extract use-
value-preserving concessions from developers, such as limits on 
future development or affordable-housing set-asides.  
Legislators should also consider expanding the compensation 
mechanism to provide greater compensation to a broader class of 
individuals. The reigning constitutional principle equates “just 
compensation” with paying “fair market value” to the landowner. 
While this rule makes it easier to determine a compensatory figure, 
there is little reason as a matter of policy to equate the injustice of 
a taking with the market’s assessment of the second-best alternative 
for the parcel. After all, awarding market value assures that nearly 
every condemnation creates some deadweight loss to society: even 
assuming the process correctly determines the “fair market 
value,”247 that value does not equal or exceed the use value that the 
owner derives from the parcel, or else the owner would have volun-
tarily sold at that price. For this reason, public choice theory 
suggests that “just compensation” should be paid at some multiple 
of the assessed “fair market value,” to make up for this foregone 
consumer surplus and force the condemnation authority to recog-
nize the actual cost of the taking to the affected party.248 The figure 
should also include the measure of economic losses that a taking 
forces upon the landowner, such as relocation expenses or lost 
goodwill.249  
                                                   
246. See, e.g., Or. Natural Res. Council v. Goodman, 505 F.3d 884 (9th Cir. 2007) (en-
joining expansion of ski resort in Mt. Ashland National Forest because of Forest Service’s 
deficient environmental impact report). 
247. This is a very big assumption. See generally David L. Callies & Shelley Ross 
Saxer, Is Fair Market Value Just Compensation? An Underlying Issue Surfaced in Kelo, in 
Eminent Domain Use and Abuse: Kelo in Context 137–65 (2006) (Dwight H. Merriam & 
Mary Massaron Ross, eds.) 
248. Commendably, the Kansas legislature has seemingly endorsed this principle: 
though the state’s post-Kelo reform bill preserves economic development takings if specifi-
cally approved by the legislature, it also allows the legislature to consider greater levels of 
compensation. Kan. Stat. Ann. § 26-501b(f) (West 2007) (“[L]egislature shall consider 
requiring compensation of at least 200% of fair market value to property owners.”). By its 
text, the provision does not require such a multiple to be paid, but it does require consid-
eration of whether a multiple should be paid, which is a step in the right direction. 
249. See Nicole Stelle Garnett, The Neglected Political Economy of Eminent Domain, 105 
Mich. L. Rev. 101, 106 (2006). As Garnett notes, these economic losses have a significant 
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Logan and Molotch would also endorse an expansion of the 
category of recipients to whom compensation is owed, including 
non-owner tenants. Although they are not formally deprived of ti-
tle, it is tenants whose use values are most significantly impacted by 
a taking. Some states have adopted some limited forms of tenant 
compensation-sharing: in California, for example, commercial ten-
ants in long-term leases at below-market rent can recover the 
“bonus value” included in the terminated lease.250 This option is 
unavailable to many residential tenants, however, since residential 
leases are typically month-to-month arrangements with no locked-
in bonus value. Logan and Molotch would recommend expanding 
the scope of these tenant-protecting mechanisms to compensate all 
tenants, through a mechanism tied to the destroyed use value 
rather than the parcel’s exchange value. 
3. Judicial Review 
Finally, both public choice theory and the Growth Machine 
model imply the need for a greater judicial role in the eminent 
domain process. Although Kelo endorses judicial minimalism in the 
takings context, even it recognizes that the takings power is not 
boundless: the Court explained that “the City would no doubt be 
forbidden from taking petitioners’ land for the purpose of confer-
ring a private benefit on a particular private party” nor could it 
“take property under the mere pretext of a public purpose, when 
its actual purpose was to bestow a private benefit.”251 Unfortunately, 
both public choice theory and the Growth Machine model suggest 
that municipal authorities are susceptible to precisely this forbid-
den model of condemnation. And the ineffectiveness of post-Kelo 
                                                   
impact on small business owners, who find it difficult or impossible to reopen after reloca-
tion. Id. To cite one anecdote, Robert Blue, owner of the 70-year-old Bernard Luggage 
Company at the famed intersection of Hollywood and Vine, waged a prominent media war 
against the city of Los Angeles, arguing that much of his business was derived from his 
unique location and that relocation to a less prominent street corner would shutter the 
business. Blue ultimately negotiated a settlement that preserves the company’s position in 
the luxury hotel complex that the redevelopment authority plans to build on the site. See 
Rick Orlov, Hollywood Landmark to be Part of Major Development, L.A. Daily News, Sept. 28, 
2006, at B1. 
250. See, e.g., City of S. San Francisco v. Mayer, 79 Cal. Rptr. 2d 704, 707 (Ct. App. 
1998). Note that under California law “the parties to a lease may contractually agree to allo-
cate a condemnation award to the landlord rather than the tenant,” id., which poses a 
potential problem where landlords are in a superior negotiating position vis-à-vis their ten-
ants and therefore conceivably can secure a greater recovery than they are entitled to at 
their tenants’ expense. 
251. Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 477 (2005). 
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legislative reform252 implies that a similar problem handicaps the 
state legislature’s ability to patrol local government by itself. 
Whether the fault lies with the residential voter’s relative disinter-
est (as public choice theory suggests) or his relative powerlessness 
(as Logan and Molotch claim), the inability to achieve consistent, 
meaningful reform through legislation suggests that that courts 
should reconsider the post-Berman abdication of judicial review.  
Heightened judicial review of individual takings alleviates some 
of public choice theorists’ concerns because judges are less vulner-
able to capture by special interests. Unlike politicians who can 
trade access for political favors, judges operate within ethics guide-
lines that limit their interaction with the public and for the most 
part are not dependent upon political contributions to sustain 
their positions. Logan and Molotch would also welcome greater 
judicial involvement in takings decisions. Judges generally do not 
benefit directly from the increase in exchange values due to inten-
sifying land use, and unlike politicians, their reputations are not 
enhanced by the achievement of community growth goals. As a 
result, judges are less likely to participate in the Growth Machine 
coalition and therefore can dispassionately weigh the competing 
exchange and use values involved in a given condemnation.  
Courts have expressed frustration with the difficulty of enforcing 
limits on takings from the bench. But there is no reason to believe 
that “public use” and “just compensation” are less justiciable than 
“unreasonable search” or a host of other individual rights that the 
Court has enforced through elaborately constructed doctrines.253 
The public would not long tolerate a Fourth Amendment jurispru-
dence built upon deference to the executive as the branch most 
familiar with the needs of law enforcement and therefore best situ-
ated to determine whether a given search was in fact “reasonable.” 
The public response to Kelo suggests that it is uncomfortable with 
this level of abdication over takings as well. 
It is important to recognize, however, that pitting the legislature 
against the judiciary in the struggle to define appropriate public 
uses—an exercise that occupies many law review pages in the wake 
of Kelo—creates somewhat of a false dichotomy. In reality, substan-
tive judicial review fosters a symbiotic relationship between the 
branches, each of which plays a crucial role in fine-tuning takings 
law. Legislatures have broad authority to identify and remedy public 
                                                   
252. See generally Somin, supra note 7. 
253. Cf. Note, The Lesson of Lopez: The Political Dynamics of Federalism’s Political Safeguards, 
119 Harv. L. Rev. 609, 629–30 (2005) (arguing that political safeguards are inadequate to 
protect federalism principles and cheering greater judicial enforcement of constitutional 
federalism principles). 
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problems within their jurisdiction, and the condemnation power 
exists as one valuable tool with which to do so. Judicial review 
serves as a feedback mechanism for the legislature’s use of that 
power in individual cases, particularly those lying at the periphery 
of permissible public uses. Adverse judicial decisions serve as shots 
across the legislature’s bow, defining the outer limits of the legisla-
ture’s authority and reminding the political branches of the need 
to regulate only within their constitutionally-prescribed powers.  
Recent reform efforts in Michigan and Ohio demonstrate the ef-
fectiveness of this symbiotic relationship. As Kelo was winding its 
way toward the Supreme Court in mid-2004, the Michigan Su-
preme Court repealed its Poletown decision in County of Wayne v. 
Hathcock, holding that the state constitution’s “public use” limita-
tion did not extend to economic development takings.254 Following 
Hathcock, Michigan’s legislature amended the state constitution to 
prohibit “the taking of private property for transfer to a private en-
tity for the purpose of economic development or enhancement of 
tax revenues” and to assess blight on a parcel-by-parcel basis under 
a clear-and-convincing-evidence standard.255 The legislature has 
also adopted statutory measures that modify the statutory defini-
tion of “public use” to conform to Hathcock, to provide increases 
in compensation to condemned residential tenants, and to allow 
low-income individuals to recover attorneys’ fees following an un-
successful condemnation challenge.256  
Ohio presents another example of judicially-spurred legislative re-
form. Like many other states, Ohio adopted a post-Kelo reform 
package in 2005 that proved largely ineffective. The statute pur-
ported to enact a temporary moratorium on economic development 
takings until December 31, 2006, but only if economic development 
was the “primary purpose.”257 The statute also preserved the familiar 
exception for blight, defined as, inter alia, conditions that threaten 
“sound growth” or constitute an “economic or social liability.” 
                                                   
254. County of Wayne v. Hathcock, 684 N.W.2d 765, 779–80 (Mich. 2004); see also 
Mich. Const. art. 10, § 2 (2004) (“Private property shall not be taken for public use without 
just compensation therefore being first made or secured in a manner prescribed by law. . . . 
Compensation shall be determined in proceedings in a court of record.”). 
255. Mich. Const. art. 10, § 2. 
256. See Castle Coalition, 50 State Report Card, at 26 (2007), http:// 
www.castlecoalition.org/pdf/publications/report_card/50_State_Report.pdf (summarizing 
Michigan reforms). 
257. See Am. Sub. S.B. 167, § 1, 126th Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Ohio 2005) (exempting 
“blight” condemnations from temporary moratorium on economic development takings); 
Ohio Rev. Code § 303.26(E) (2007) (defining blight to include “deterioration” of structures 
or where the site “substantially impairs or arrests the sound growth of a county, retards the 
provision of housing accommodations, or constitutes an economic or social liability and is a 
menace to the public health, safety, morals, or welfare.”). 
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Shortly thereafter, the Ohio Supreme Court in Norwood v. Horney 
invalidated economic development takings as forbidden by the 
state constitution because such a taking is not a “public use.”258 The 
Court explained that “although economic factors may be consid-
ered in determining whether private property may be 
appropriated, the fact that the appropriation would provide an 
economic benefit to the government and community, standing 
alone, does not satisfy the [Ohio Constitution’s] public-use re-
quirement.”259 In response, the legislature recently adopted more 
sweeping condemnation reforms that explicitly barred economic 
development takings and narrowed the blight exception.260 The 
legislature explicitly cited Norwood as the rationale for its reform 
and expressed its intention to conform condemnation practices 
statewide to the court’s constitutional rule.261 
These examples demonstrate how substantive judicial review at 
the constitutional level can spur policy reform by fostering a 
healthy dialogue between a legislature focused on what it should 
do and a judiciary focused on what the legislature may do. This 
symbiosis only grows stronger when the dialogue moves from the 
constitutional to the statutory sphere, where the state legislature 
has defined the scope of municipal condemnation in more explicit 
terms and the judiciary’s role is to apply those standards to indi-
vidual cases. Here, free of the uneasy responsibility of breathing 
life into vague constitutional phrases, the judiciary is free instead 
                                                   
258. Norwood v. Horney, 853 N.E.2d 1115, 1146 (Ohio 2006). 
259. Id. at 1123. 
260. See Ohio Rev. Code Ann. §§ 1.08, 303.26(E) (West 2008). Specifically, the re-
vised definition contains two lists of criteria by which a parcel might be considered 
“blighted.” See id. § 1.08(B). The first list encompasses what one may consider traditional 
“blight” factors, such as being “unfit for human habitation or use” because it is “unsanitary, 
unsafe, or vermin infested,” or “pos[ing] a direct threat to public health or safety . . . by reason 
of environmentally hazardous conditions, solid waste pollution, or contamination.” Id. 
§ 1.08(B)(1). The second list contains more generic conditions such as “dilapidation and dete-
rioration,” “age and obsolescence,” or “faulty lot layout in relation to size, adequacy, 
accessibility, or usefulness.” Id. § 1.08(B)(2). A plot may be designated as blighted if it satisfies 
two or more criteria from this list, which “collectively considered, adversely affect surround-
ing or community property values or entail land use relationships that cannot reasonably be 
corrected through codes or other land use regulations.” Id. This second category remains 
somewhat problematic, as its criteria remain broad and are still seemingly tied to the goal of 
economic development. But this definition is further tempered by the condition that 
“[w]hen determining whether a property is a blighted parcel or whether an area is a 
blighted area or slum for the purposes of this section, no person shall consider whether 
there is a comparatively better use for any premises, property, structure, area, or portion of 
an area, or whether the property could generate more tax revenues if put to another use.” 
Id. § 1.08(C). While not ideal, this amended definition provides greater protection to 
homeowners and residents than the pre-Norwood definition, and this additional protection is 
explicitly due to the guidance the Ohio Supreme Court delivered in that opinion. 
261. Am. Sub. S.B. 7, § 4, 127th Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Ohio 2007). 
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to measure municipal actions against the legislature’s policy yard-
sticks and provide clear guidance to condemnation authorities 
regarding the permissible scope of their power. In the process, sub-
stantive judicial review helps ferret out the cases where a putative 
public use serves as a fig leaf for the private ends of development 
elites or the Growth Machine. 
Public choice theory and the Urban Growth Machine model ap-
proach the political landscape from diametrically opposite 
perspectives: one places tremendous faith in the market and the 
other vehemently denies the importance of exchange. Yet despite 
their differences, both schools stand united in their denounce-
ment of condemnations undertaken for purposes of economic 
development and are dubious that the post-Kelo wave of legislative 
reforms has achieved—or will achieve—lasting protection against 
eminent domain abuse. Therefore despite their differences, com-
mentators on both sides of this political spectrum can support 
substantive reforms designed to curb economic development tak-
ings, and more robust procedures that communicate to the public 
the true costs and benefits of a proposed condemnation. Both mod-
els also demand that courts shoulder at least some of this reform 
burden through an iterative process that ferrets out the political 
branches’ inevitable failures. The judiciary’s responsibility to “say 
what the law is”262 must prevent it from continuing to duck its du-
ties in the interests of convenience or political expediency. 
                                                   
262. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803). 
